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Dimensions of Scientific Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Sandra D. Mitchell
Sandra D. Mitchell*
Affiliation:
History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
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Abstract

Biological knowledge does not fit the image of science that philosophers have developed. Many argue that biology has no laws. Here I criticize standard normative accounts of law and defend an alternative, pragmatic approach. I argue that a multidimensional conceptual framework should replace the standard dichotomous law/accident distinction in order to display important differences in the kinds of causal structure found in nature and the corresponding scientific representations of those structures. To this end I explore the dimensions of stability, strength, and degree of abstraction that characterize the variety of scientific knowledge claims found in biology and other sciences.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue 2 , June 2000 , pp. 242 - 265
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learing, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

‡

The research for this paper was supported by National Science Foundation. Science and Technology Studies Program. Grant No. 9710615. An earlier version was read at the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division Meetings, December 1998. I wish to thank Joel M. Smith for inspiring criticisms and suggestions, Michael Weisberg for able research assistance, and Peter Machamer, Nancy Cartwright, and the two referees for insightful comments.

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