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Three Types of Referential Opacity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Richard Sharvy
Richard Sharvy*
Affiliation:
Swarthmore College
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Abstract

Three distinct things have been called “referential opacity,” causing some confusion. A noun position in a sentence may be opaque in three different ways: (1) substitutivity of identity may fail there, (2) quantifiers prefixed to the sentence may not be able to bind variables in that position, or (3) substitutivity of identity may fail when the singular nouns in question are read as having small scope. Some connections among these three types of opacity are examined.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , June 1972 , pp. 153 - 161
Copyright
Copyright © 1972 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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