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Definition of a Moral Judgment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Timothy L. S. Sprigge
Affiliation:
University of Sussex.

Extract

An Important distinction between statements of fact and statements of value is widely recognised. Some philosophers are now saying that the distinction has been treated as more determinate than it is, but most philosophers would agree that the distinction is definite and important. The major contributions to Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy of this century have set out to illuminate the nature of this distinction. Ethical statements have been thevalue statements mainly at issue, but on the whole the aim has not been to show wherein they differ from other value statements, but to show what distinguishes them in common with other value statements from factual statements. The characterisations of ethical statements which have become famous areones which if they apply to ethical statements at all apply equally to many(or all) other value statements as well.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1964

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