^{page 194 note 1} I ignore any complications that might possibly be involved in Aristotle's talk of the “lawful” and “unlawful” in this context. (E.N. V. Chs. 1–2.)

^{page 197 note 1} The foregoing is a reaffirmation of views expressed in my article “Self and Others: A Defence of Altruism”. (Philosophical Quarterly, April 1954, pp. 113–114.)

^{page 197 note 2} “When values are called impersonal, it means that though they are qualities revealed in and through persons, yet they are imperatives or notes of perfection to which the persons as facts are subordinate.” (Some Suggestions in Ethics, p. 11, cf. pp. 7–8.) The tone of this passage seems to me quite characteristic.

^{page 200 note 1} Augustine, Confessions III 12.

^{page 200 note 2} “Tria mirabilia fecit Dominus: res ex nihilo, Hominem Deum, liberum arbitrium” (Cogitationes Privatae). The sentence is taken by Koyré for the motto of his book Descartes und die Scholastik.

^{page 201 note 1} E.N. VIII 1155a.

^{page 204 note 1} I have again used the language of J. A. K. Thomson's translation.

^{page 205 note 1} Bradley, Aphorisms, 80. Bradley continues: “But love is the passionate attempt to find oneself in another. And oneself is unique.” But even if we were to accept this view of the nature of passionate love our problem of “rationalising the preference” would remain as before.

^{page 205 note 2} Cf. Mayo Ethics and the Moral Life pp. 198–9, ending: “Love is a personal relation which has nothing to do with reasons. Morality has everything to do with reasons.” Although I am so far in agreement with Mayo my positive conclusions on this whole matter of “respect for persons” are widely different from his, as anyone may see who compares the remainder of my own discussion with Chapters VIII and IX of The Logic of Personality. I take this opportunity of saying (in self-defence and not for Mayo's sake, who needs no defence from me) that I have been silent about Mayo's thesis in the body of my paper not because I think it unimportant, which is the reverse of the truth, but because I could see no way of doing justice to it in comment merely incidental to the exposition of my own views. It would need a paper to itself.

^{page 206 note 1} “What they are” here means, of course, “what-like persons they are”:the context makes this plain, though the phrase by itself could be misunderstood. To treat as irrelevant the “whatness” that constitutes the being a person would be to hold that everything that is is to be “respected” simply as “being”. Perhaps this is a possible view: perhaps indeed the notion of respect for persons is an unstable compromise between that view and a view that treats as relevant to our attitude the total “whatness” of particular beings. In the present paper, however, I am supposing otherwise; and the point is one for the determination of which a clearer concept of “person” than I can claim to possess would be essential.

^{page 206 note 2} “A Fortnight in N.W. Luristan”, in The Valleys of the Assassins.

^{page 209 note 1} Wordsworth, “A Poet's Epitaph”.

^{page 210 note 1} There is of course also a “pre-history” of the properly moral consciousness in which the language of “obligation” is used to, and imitatively by, us. I am not suggesting that we should easily, if at all, come to a genuine awareness of duty without this, though neither can that awareness be explained by this alone. The “pre-history” of our moral consciousness, however, does not here concern me.

^{page 215 note 1} Tempest, Act I, Sc. ii. I am not quite clear how, in relation to our question, Coleridge's comment on this passage is to be understood. The crux is how we are to interpret his references to “affection” and “volition” respectively. (See Raysor: Coleridge's Shakespearian Criticism I, p. 134.)

^{page 215 note 2} Bradley, Aphorisms, 75.