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    Parameswaran, Nandan and Chakrapani, Pani N. 2015. Transactions on Engineering Technologies.

    Parameswaran, Nandan Kakkad, Jignesh and Maheshwari, Piyush 2014. 2014 Annual IEEE India Conference (INDICON). p. 1.

    Oyama, Katsunori Chang, Carl K. and Mitra, Simanta 2011. Handbook of Research on Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments.

    Chang, Carl K. Jiang, Hsin-yi Ming, Hua and Oyama, Katsunori 2009. Situ: A Situation-Theoretic Approach to Context-Aware Service Evolution. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, Vol. 2, Issue. 3, p. 261.

    Chang, Carl K. Oyama, Katsunori Jaygarl, Hojun and Ming, Hua 2008. 2008 Second International Symposium on Universal Communication. p. 59.

    Ming, Hua Oyama, Katsunori and Chang, Carl K. 2008. 2008 12th IEEE International Workshop on Future Trends of Distributed Computing Systems. p. 51.


The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions

  • Richard Scheer (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 January 2004

This theory regards intentions as mental states, e.g., attitudes, which, typically, have causal power. But we do not speak of our intentions as having such powers. Instead, we speak of a person's resolve, determination, or his anxiety, eagerness, and so forth, as the ‘powers’ that move us. Of course, one desires for various reasons to carry out his various intentions but that desire is not a component of the intentions. An intention is, roughly, the course of action that one has adopted, so it has no such components.

There are other characteristics of intentions which the mental state idea of intentions does not share. Intentions do not have the temporal characteristics that mental states have, or share the curious context dependency that intentions have. And since, according to the theory, mental states operate causally, it would not be possible for a person to commit himself to a course of action as we ordinarily do when we make a promise or sign an agreement or contract.

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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