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Biosecurity implications of the synthesis of pathogenic viruses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Aleksandr Rabodzey
Aleksandr Rabodzey*
Affiliation:
Doctoral candidate, Division of Biological Engineering, Associate, Security Studies Program, Room 3–252, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA rabodzey@armscontrol.ru

Abstract

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Recent peer-reviewed reports of in vitro syntheses of small viruses raise the possibility of misapplying modern biotechnologies to the creation of new smallpox virus, not simply to the malicious manipulation of existing samples. While it would require great effort and significant financing, a smallpox-from-scratch project would seem likely to be feasible, as would some other pathogen-from-scratch projects. Efforts to prevent such work — or, failing prevention, to detect it — might be enhanced in a number of ways.

Type
Graduate Student Award
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , September 2003 , pp. 44 - 49
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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