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Introduction to Academics in the Arena: Political Scientists Who Have Served in Elected Office

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2018

Mathew Manweller
Mathew Manweller*
Affiliation:
Central Washington University
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Type
Symposium: Academics in the Arena: Political Scientists Who Have Served in Elected Office
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , January 2018 , pp. 141 - 146
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2018 

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References

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