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Polarized Agents: Campaign Contributions by Lobbyists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2009

Gregory Koger  and
Jennifer Nicoll Victor
Gregory Koger
Affiliation:
University of Miami
Jennifer Nicoll Victor
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Abstract

Are professional lobbyists loyal partisans? There are thousands of professional lobbyists in Washington, D.C., who work with members of Congress and their staffs, many of whom also make contributions to congressional candidates and political parties. Although many lobbyists have backgrounds in partisan politics, they may have incentives to give money to candidates from both parties. This article finds that professional lobbyists tend to make personal contributions to their preferred party exclusively.

Type
Features
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 42 , Issue 3 , July 2009 , pp. 485 - 488
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2009

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