Hostname: page-component-7bb8b95d7b-lvwk9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-09-19T15:59:39.033Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Augustine on will, freedom, and foreknowledge: De libero arbitrio, III, 1–3

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2015

CHRISTOPHER HUGHES
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, King's College London Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK e-mail: christopher.hughes@kcl.ac.uk
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Towards the beginning of the third book of De libero arbitrio, Augustine defends the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. His defence appears to involve the idea that the will is essentially free. I discuss and evaluate Augustine's reasons for thinking that the will is essentially free, and the way that Augustine moves from the essential freedom of the will to the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 52 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 315 - 332
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Augustine, St (1961) On Free Choice of the Will, Benjamin, A. S. & Hackstaff, L. H. (trs) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill).Google Scholar
Hopkins, Jasper (1994) Philosophical Criticism: Essays and Reviews (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press).Google Scholar
Rowe, William (1964) ‘Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will’, The Review of Metaphysics, 18, 356–363.Google Scholar