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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Suppose that I stand firmly in what Alasdair MacIntyre describes as the Thomistic tradition of moral enquiry. I try my best to recover a historical understanding of Aquinas's teachings, and I refuse to let my philosophical opponents set the terms of debate. Now suppose that you yourself are one of my opponents: a Buddhist, a Jew, a Muslim or perhaps a secular humanist. (It makes no difference whether or not you believe in God, just so long as whatever theological commitments you might have diverge sharply from my own.) Finally, suppose that I have always found you a considerate neighbour, a friendly and responsible colleague, and a reliable contributor to worthy causes: you run the neighbourhood recycling programme, do volunteer work at an AIDS hospice, and serve as den mother of your son's Cub Scout troop. All of my experience suggests that you are, by commonly accepted standards, morally admirable; but you don't believe in God, or at least your own understanding of God and God's law differs significantly from my own. Am I, as a loyal Thomist, able to acknowledge your virtues? Or must I dismiss them all as merely apparent?
1 I am indebted to Akeel Bilgrami, Michael Kelly, Shaughan Lavine, Thomas Pogge and especially Mary Mothersill for their helpful comments on drafts of this paper.
2 In describing moral provincialism only in terms of sex-, religion- and ethnicity-based exclusions, my aim is mainly to keep the argument as simple as possible. Others might wish to argue for a more elaborate description. (One might, for example, include along with sex, religion and ethnic group, socioeconomic class, nationality, and so on.)
3 This position is more extreme than Aristotle's. Although Aristotle insists that women are incapable of wisdom, he holds that they can at least acquire virtues proportionate to their limited rationality.
4 MacIntyre, Alasdair, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 8:Google Scholar ‘The concept of a kind of rational inquiry which is inseparable from the intellectual and social tradition in which it is embodied will be misunderstood unless four considerations are borne in mind. The first has already been touched upon: the concept of rational justification which is at home in that form of enquiry is essentially historical. To justify is to narrate how the argument has gone so far.’
5 Nussbaum's, Martha excellent essay (‘Virtue revived,’ Times Literary Supplement, (3 07 1992), 9–11)Google Scholar concludes that we need not ‘choose between virtue and enlightenment,’ a position that I firmly endorse. On the other hand, the type of virtue theory that she defends views virtue ethics ‘as offering an internal critique and enrichment of the Enlightenment’; it leans heavily on universality and impartiality; and in other respects it seems to require rather more, or at least something more specific, than what I call moral cosmopolitanism. Like most of today's classical scholars, Nussbaum emphasizes the continuity between Aristotle's ethics and Stoic ethics and makes favourable mention of Christian writings only insofar as they relate to ancient texts. This emphasis fits nicely with the tendency of contemporary virtue theorists to present themselves as neo-Aristotelians. For arguments against this avowed connection with Aristotelianism see Peter, Simpson, ‘Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle,’ Review of Metaphysics, 45 (1992), 503–24.Google Scholar
6 MacIntyre, , Whose Justice?, p. 346.Google Scholar For critical discussions of this, MacIntyre's central thesis, see George, Robert P., ‘Moral Particularism, Thomism, and Traditions,’ Review of Metaphysics, 42 (1989), 593–605;Google ScholarIsaac, Jeffrey C., review of Whose Justice? in Political Theory, 17 (1989), 663–701;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Quinn, Philip L., review of Whose Justice? in Faith and Philosophy, 8 (1991), 109–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 I do not labour this point because it has already been argued effectively in Stocker, Michael, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,’ Journal of Philosophy, 73 (1976), 453–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8 MacIntyre, , Whose Justice?, p. 165.Google Scholar
9 Ibid. pp. 192–3.
10 Ibid. pp. 181–2.
11 Although he has recently given the Stoics a bit more credit than he did in earlier works, MacIntyre still consistently underrates their contribution, not only to the history of ethics in general but also to Christian ethics in particular. For a useful corrective see the review of After Virtue by Long, A. A., ‘Greek Ethics After MacIntyre and the Stoic Community of Reason,’ Ancient Philosophy, 3 (1983), 184–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 MacIntyre, , Whose Justice?, p. 205.Google Scholar The expression ‘natural virtues’ denotes naturally acquired moral virtues, as opposed to supernatural virtues ‘infused’ in the human agent by God. Scholastics usually used ‘acquired’ and ‘infused’ to make the same distinction, but I follow MacIntyre in using ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ instead.
13 MacIntyre, , Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 140.Google Scholar
14 De civitate Dei, V, c. 19.
15 Contra Julianum, IV, c. 3.
16 De civitate Dei, XIX, c. 25; cf. Romans 14:23.
17 De civitate Dei, XXI, c. 16.
18 See, for example, De civitate Dei, XIV, c. 28.
19 Augustine's apocalyptic dualism is discussed in detail in Oort, Johannes van, Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine's ‘City of God’ and the Sources of his Doctrine of the Two Cities (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), esp. pp. 115–23, 151–3;Google Scholar and Veer, Albert C. de, ‘Rom. 14,23b dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin,’ Recherches Augustiniennes, 8 (1972), 149–85, esp. pp. 179–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
20 De civitate Dei, V, c. 13; V, c. 19.
21 For historical background see Odon Lottin, ‘La connexion des vertus chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses Prédécesseurs,’ Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, vol. 3, Problèmes de morale, pt. 1 (Louvain/Gembloux: Abbaye du Mont César, 1949), pp. 197–252.Google Scholar
22 Summa Theologiae, Ia–IIae, q. 65, a. 2; IIa–IIae, q. 23, a. 7.
23 Lottin, Odon, ‘Les vertus morales acquises sont-elles de vraies vertus? La réponse des théologiens de saint Thomas à Pierre Auriol’, Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 21 (1954), 101–29, esp. pp. 102–3;Google ScholarGilson, Etienne, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Shook, L. K. (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 340–1;Google ScholarKlubertanz, George, ‘Une théorie sur les vertus morales “naturelles” et “surnaturelles,”’ Revue Thomiste, 59 (1959), 565–75;Google ScholarHamain, L., ‘Morale chrétienne et réalités terrestres: Une réponse de saint Thomas d'Aquin: la “béatitude imparfaite,”’ Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 35 (1968), 134–76, 260–90, esp. pp. 266–72.Google Scholar
24 Vio, Thomas de (Cajetan), commentary on Summa Theologiae, IIa–IIae, q. 23, a. 7Google Scholar, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia (Leonine ed., Rome, 1882–), vol. 8, p. 172.Google Scholar
25 Summa Theologiae, IIa–IIae, q. 23, a. 7.
26 For just one example see Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, dist. 7, nn. 28–39, and the related commentary by Wolter, , in Wolter, Allan B., ed. and trans., Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), pp. 48–51, 219–25.Google Scholar
27 Summa Theologiae, IIa–IIae, q. 10, a. 4; q. 23, a. 7, ad 1. Aquinas's relatively cosmopolitan view of nonChristians was endorsed, about three centuries later, by the Roman Catholic Church. In 1567 Pius V, the same pope who declared Aquinas a doctor of the Church, condemned as heretical the thesis: ‘All the deeds of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices.’ Michael Baius, the Belgian theologian who had defended this thesis, complained that it was backed by the authority of both St Paul and St Augustine. Unmoved, the pope responded by reiterating his original condemnation and ordering Baius not only to submit but to produce a formal disavowal.
28 One can find this crucial distinction in many articles of the Prima Secundae. The most helpful discussions are in Ia–IIae, q. 62, a. i, and q. 63, a. 3; but see also q. 3, a. 6; q. 4, aa. 5–6; q. 5, a. 5. Bear in mind, though, that the Summa Theologiae is a textbook intended for those just beginning to study moral theology – which means, in practice, that Aquinas often presents issues in less detail and with less argument than he does elsewhere. On this particular distinction and issues connected with it, a work contemporary with the Secunda Pars of the Summa – namely, Aquinas's disputed questions ‘On the Virtues in General’ – is more informative. See especially De virtutibus in communi, q. un., aa. 9–10.
29 Summa Theologiae, Ia–IIae, q. 62, a. 1.
30 On infused moral virtues see Summa Theologiae, Ia–IIae, q. 63, aa. 3–4; q. 65, aa. 2–4; De virtutibus in communi, q. un., a. 10, ad 8, 14, 16, 18; a. 12, corp. & ad 12; De virtutibus cardinalibus, q. un, a. 2, corp.; Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, dist. 33, q. 1, aa. 2–3.
31 Summa Theologiae, Ia–IIae, q. 65, a. 4, ad 1.
32 See, for example, Lottin, Odon, Principes de morale, vol. 2 (Louvain: Editions du Mont César, 1947), pp. 213–25;Google Scholar cf. Scotus, , Ordinatio III, dist. 36,Google Scholar in Wolter, , Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, pp. 414/15–416/17.Google Scholar It bears mention that Aquinas's defence of, and Scotus's attack on, ‘infused’ (supernatural) moral virtues became one of the standard points of controversy between the later Thomistic and Scotistic schools. Since Aquinas died many years before Scotus criticized him for positing completely superfluous virtues, he was unable to answer the criticism himself. Cajetan, however, does his utmost to answer the criticism in his commentary on Summa Theologiae, Ia–IIae, q. 63, a. 3. (See vol. 6 of the Leonine edition, pp. 409–10.)
33 MacIntyre, , Whose Justice?, p. 205;Google Scholar cf. Gilson, , Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas, pp. 333–50, esp. pp. 338–9;Google ScholarGarrigou-Lagrange, R., Christian Perfection and Contemplation According to St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross, trans. Doyle, M. T. (St Louis: B. Herder, 1939), pp. 61–2.Google Scholar
34 MacIntyre, apparently believes the Secunda Secundae presents religion as a natural moral virtue (Whose Justice?, pp. 188, 201).Google Scholar For textual evidence and argument to the contrary see Gilson, Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas, pp. 333–9.
35 See e.g. Gilson, , Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas, pp. 338–40.Google Scholar I myself find this interpretation hard to square with texts where Aquinas argues that ‘we’ – ‘we’ apparently referring to human beings in general, including Christians – need both natural and supernatural virtues. See, for example, De virtutibus in communi, q. un, a. 1, ad 11.
36 For a discussion of how this conclusion might be avoided see MacDonald, Scott, ‘Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning: Aquinas's Aristotelian Moral Psychology and Anscombe's Fallacy’, Philosophical Review, 100 (1991), 31–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A more technical problem is that the recipient of God's grace would become incapable of any moral improvement owing to her own efforts. According to Aquinas, human efforts can augment only natural virtues; they can at most prepare and dispose the human agent to receive an increase in supernatural virtues, for supernatural virtues can be augmented by God alone. (See, e.g., De virtutibus in communi, q. un., a. 11.)
37 For some attempted solutions see Coerver, Robert, The Quality of Facility in the Moral Virtues (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1946);Google ScholarBullet, Gabriel, Vertus morales infuses et vertus morales acquises selon saint Thomas d' Aqwn (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1958);Google Scholar and Klubertanz, ‘Une théorie sur les vertus morales.’
38 A position similar to my own is defended by Akeel Bilgrami in an analysis of the Islamic tradition and its critics. See ‘What Is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity,’ Critical Inquiry, 18 (1992), 821–42, esp. pp. 825–6.Google Scholar
39 Inter alia, George, ‘Moral Particularism’; Quinn, review of Whose Justice?; Barry, Brian, ‘The Light That Failed?’ Ethics, 100 (1989), 160–8;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Stout, Jeffrey, ‘Homeward Bound: MacIntyre on Liberal Society and the History of Ethics,’ Journal of Religion, 69 (1989), 220–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
40 Galston, William A., Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. chap. 12, ‘Public virtue and religion.’CrossRefGoogle Scholar
