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Evilism and the a priori

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

JOE MILBURN Open the ORCID record for JOE MILBURN [Opens in a new window]
JOE MILBURN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Navarra, Campus Universitario, 31009Pamplona, Spain
*
e-mail: jmilburn@unav.es
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Abstract

In this article, I respond to Stephen Law's evil god challenge (EGC) to traditional theism. I argue that while there are credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, there are no credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-evil. Because of this, theists have a reason for explaining away the a posteriori evidence against theism. The hypothetical evilist, on the other hand, does not. Thus, while the problem of the good makes it absurd to believe in evilism, the problem of evil does not make it absurd to believe in theism.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 57 , Issue 4 , December 2021 , pp. 752 - 761
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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