^{page 55 note 1} We may want to say that it is really only the accepted historical implications of these stories which are taken as reasons for first order type I statements. As such, a story can function as a reason only if some of its historical implications are accepted. And yet it would seem that we ought not to say this, for many who would refuse to accept any of the historical implications of the creation story still offer it as backing for first order type I statements. ‘But how can a mere story be a reason for anything?’ We might say that a mere story is not a reason for first order type I statements but is rather a poetic way of expressing attitudes occasioned by the acceptance of first order type I statements. We might say that a mere story is poetry in that it calls attention to patterns in the world which are taken as evidence for first order type I statements. (What is a pattern? What patterns?) We might say that the story is not a mere story but a symbol. (A symbol for what though: for anything intelligible?) We might say that in fact most believers do take the creation story as having historical implications, and add that when someone rejects the historical implications and still uses the stories as backing for first order type I statements he has failed to notice that one consequence of his rejection is that he can no longer use the story as a reason. The last three alternatives seem to be most plausible.

^{page 56 note 1} MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘The Logical Status of Religious Beliefs’, in Metaphysical Beliefs (SCM Press).Google Scholar

^{page 56 note 2} This last condition is essential. I am strongly inclined to think that this claim (something is holy) will, in the last analysis, be justified by an appeal to religious experience. For example, the Bible or the Church may be experienced as ‘the cradle in which Christ is laid’. But though this appeal is, I think, essential, it presents numerous difficulties of its own and I shall not discuss it here.