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The return of truth: defending the correspondence theory after the liberal/postliberal divide

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 February 2019

JOHN ALLAN KNIGHT Open the ORCID record for JOHN ALLAN KNIGHT [Opens in a new window]
JOHN ALLAN KNIGHT*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Marist College, 3399 North Road, Poughkeepsie, NY12601, USA
*
e-mail: john.knight@marist.edu
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Abstract

This article defends the correspondence theory of truth against criticisms of three theologians: Stephen Long, Kevin Hector, and Bruce Marshall. Long's criticisms arise from his metaphysical commitments, Hector's from his anti-metaphysical commitments, and Marshall's from his methodological commitments. I treat Long and Hector briefly, before giving a more extended treatment of Bruce Marshall's attack on the correspondence theory using the slingshot argument of Donald Davidson. I argue that correspondence theories withstand their criticisms. They therefore pose no obstacle to using them in theology.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 578 - 595
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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