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ANZUS: A blow to Britain's self-esteem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

John Williams
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Extract

It took some time for Labour and Conservative politicians to come to terms with the modest though useful role that Britain performed in Asia after the withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent. Old perceptions and postures were slow to fade aways a fact that was clearly demonstrated by their response to the ANZUS treaty. For three years nostalgia and a desire to remain a global power distorted their assessment of this new pact in the western Pacific. They were far more myopic on this occasion than their military and civilian advisers, who found it easier to adjust to the post-imperial situation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 4 , October 1987 , pp. 243 - 263
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1987

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References

1. House of Commons Debates, 5s, vol. 486, 19 April 1951, Co. 2007.

2. Percy Spender denies that Britain sought or even expressed a wish to join ANZUS. Spender, P., Exercises in Diplomacy (Sydney, 1969), pp. 96, 97, 99, 100.Google Scholar Alan Watt acknowledges that there were many in Britain who resented their exclusion from the pact. As to whether Britain applied for membership and was rejected, he merely says that an authoritative explanation would have to wait until official records were opened. Watt, Alan, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1939–65 (London, 1967), pp. 138–9.Google Scholar Later he was more forthcoming: in the Canberra Timesht wrote that no evidence had come to his notice during the discussions in 1951 of Britain's desire to join ANZUS. Canberra Times, 18 October 1969.

3. Ministers in Canberra were accustomed to thinking in terms of military pacts. Ever since 1936, they had at one time or another advocated the setting up of a defence arrangement in the Pacific. Thus at the London Commonwealth Conference in May 1946 Prime Minister J. B. Chifley called for a common scheme of defence.

4. At the Commonwealth Conference in 1946 the United Kingdom had welcomed the Australian proposal that members should assume more responsibility for the defence of their region. Up to the summer of 1948, in the absence of an obvious threat, little defence sharing had actually taken place, although Britain's ability to project herself militarily in Asia had suffered a severe blow with the loss of the Indian Army and the unwillingness of Nehru to co-operate in the defence of commonwealth interests.

5. Spender, op. cit., p. 37.

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9. Ibid., p. 120.

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24. Ibid.

25. CM (51) 13, minute 2.

26. Ibid.

27. FO 371, 92071, fo. 2.

28. Ibid. On 8 February Dean Rusk asked Prime Minister Holland ‘whether a tripartite arrangement among Australia, New Zealand and the United States would not suffice to meet their security requirement? Holland said ‘he whole-heartedly agreed to this approach to Pacific security.’ Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 6, op. cit., p. 149.Google Scholar

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48. CP (51) 64.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. CM (51) 16, minute 3.

53. FO 371, 92072, fo. 29.

54. CP (51) 76.

55. Ibid.

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57. CP (51) 76.

58. Ibid.

59. CAB 128, 19, minute 8.

60. FO 371, 92072, fo. 32.

61. FO 371, 92073, fo. 42.

62. Ibid., fo. 57.

63. FO 35, 5968, fo. 150.

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74. The actual planning was done at Service level. Initially it concerned itself with planning the defence of air and sea communications in the region. Joint planning led to joint operations. Political direction of ANZAM depended upon opportunities afforded by occasional meetings of commonwealth ministers. ‘ANZAM’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institution (London, 1955), vol. 100, p. 537.Google Scholar

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83. House of Commons Debates, 5s, vol. 505, 14 October 1952, Co. 28.

84. C (52) 395.

85. Ibid.

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87. DO 35, 5969, fo. 300.

88. Ibid., fo. 297.

89. The Times, 15 December, 1952.

90. CC (52) 103, minute 2.

91. DO 35, 5970, fo. 337.

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100. Ibid.

101. There was already in existence a regional agency consisting of the military representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and France for exchange of intelligence and preparation of plans, without commitment to governments, to meet further Chinese aggression.

102. House of Commons Debate, 5s, vol. 516, 17 Jun e 1953, Co. 973.

103. Senator Taft's statement 5 June 1953. DEFE 11, 56, fo. 253.

104. DO 35, 5974, fo. 16, 29.

105. Ibid.

106. DO 35, 5970, fo. 342.

107. DO 35, 5971, fo. 418.

108. Ibid. At the meeting of the Council, Admiral Radford was opposed to any linkage between ANZUS and ANZAM—an idea that Menzies and Holland earlier in the year had tentatively proposed. Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 12, op. cit., p. 346.Google Scholar

109. FO 371, 103529, fo. 3, The Times, 8 December 1953.

110. C (54), 134.