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Authorising humanitarian intervention: a five-point defence of existing multilateral procedures

  • Stefano Recchia (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Even scholars who support multilateralism in principle frequently question the value of securing approval from existing multilateral bodies for humanitarian intervention. The United Nations (UN) and regional organisations such as NATO, the argument goes, are far from democratic; furthermore, multilateralism is often a recipe for doing nothing; therefore, unauthorised intervention should be permissible in circumstances of ‘humanitarian necessity’. This article maintains that although today’s multilateral organisations and related procedures for authorising armed intervention may be suboptimal, they have significant output legitimacy. First, existing authorisation procedures reduce the risk of destabilising conflict spirals among powerful states. Second, they diminish the likelihood that humanitarianism will be used as a pretext. Third, they reduce epistemic problems concerning the identification of a just cause for intervention and thus the risk of accidental abuse. Fourth, they minimise the ‘moral hazard’ of humanitarian intervention. Finally, compliance with multilateral procedures is increasingly required for successful peacebuilding. This leads me to conclude that humanitarian warfare should always be authorised by the UN or regional multilateral organisations.

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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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*Correspondence to: Dr Stefano Recchia, Department of Politics and International Studies, Alison Richard Building, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB3 9DT. Author’s email: sr638@cam.ac.uk
References
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1 FarerTom J., ‘A paradigm of legitimate intervention’, in Lori Fisler-Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p. 327 ; WheelerNicholas, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 298299 ; FranckThomas, ‘Legality and legitimacy in humanitarian intervention’, in Terry Nardin and Melissa Williams (eds), Humanitarian Intervention (New York: New York University Press, 2006); TesónFernando R., ‘The vexing problem of authority in humanitarian intervention: a proposal’, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 24:3 (2006), pp. 761772 ; PattisonJames, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 188189 , 196; HurdIan, ‘Bomb Syria, even if it is illegal’, New York Times (27 August 2013).

2 Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 74.

3 ClaudeInis, ‘Collective legitimization as a political function of the United Nations’, International Organization, 20:3 (1966), p. 372 , emphasis added.

4 WalzerMichael, ‘The politics of rescue’, Social Research, 62:1 (1995), pp. 5366 . Nevertheless, Walzer offers at best qualified support for multilateralism, which, he believes, ‘is no guarantee of anything’ (p. 63).

5 FranckThomas, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); WelshJennifer, ‘Authorizing humanitarian intervention’, in Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher (eds), The United Nations and Global Security (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 183186 .

6 WedgwoodRuth, ‘Unilateral action in a multilateral world’, in Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (eds), Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 168 .

7 ClarkIan, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 193 .

8 KeohaneRobert O., ‘The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism’, in Edward Newman, Ramesh Thakur, and John Tirman (eds), Multilateralism under Challenge (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), pp. 6061 .

9 Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 5. See also Keohane, ‘The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism’; Tesón, ‘The vexing problem of authority’.

10 See fn. 1.

11 BuchananAllen, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 450468 .

12 Tesón, ‘The vexing problem of authority’, pp. 771–2.

13 ArchibugiDaniele, ‘Cosmopolitan guidelines for humanitarian intervention’, Alternatives, 29:1 (2004), pp. 121 ; Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 233–4.

14 Franck, ‘Legality and legitimacy’; LuCatherine, ‘Whose principles? Whose institutions? Legitimacy challenges for “humanitarian intervention”’, in Nardin and Williams (eds), Humanitarian Intervention ; Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 188–9.

15 FinnemoreMartha, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 53 .

16 Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 101–10.

17 AndersonMary B., Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), esp. ch. 4. For a useful discussion of the tensions inherent in traditional humanitarian intervention, see also KupermanAlan J., ‘Humanitarian intervention’, in Michael Goodhart (ed.), Human Rights: Politics and Practice (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 291293 .

18 OrendBrian, ‘Justice after war’, Ethics & International Affairs, 16:1 (2002), pp. 4356 ; WilliamsRobert E., Jr, and CaldwellDan, ‘Jus post bellum: Just war theory and the principles of just peace’, International Studies Perspectives, 7:4 (2006), pp. 309320 .

19 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p. 39 .

20 DoyleMichael W. and SambanisNicholas, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 2030 ; JoshiMadhav and MasonT. David, ‘Civil war settlements, size of governing coalition, and durability of peace in post-civil war states’, International Interactions, 37:4 (2011), pp. 388413 . See also RecchiaStefano, ‘Just and unjust postwar reconstruction: How much external interference can be justified?’, Ethics & International Affairs, 23:2 (2009), pp. 165187 .

21 WalzerMichael, ‘The aftermath of war: Reflections on jus post bellum ’, in Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics Beyond War’s End (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), p. 38 .

22 As Michael Blake puts it, ‘we should not think ourselves licensed to intervene, unless we have both the means and the will to rebuild’. See Blake, ‘The costs of war: justice, liability, and the Pottery Barn rule’, in Don E. Scheid (ed.), The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 134 . See also Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 74.

23 The Security Council may give its retrospective approval to the exercise of self defence, or it may refrain from doing so and may insist on the cessation of the unilateral action. See DinsteinYoram, War, Aggression, and Self-Defence (5th edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 234237 .

24 RuggieJohn, ‘Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution’, International Organization, 46:3 (1992), p. 571 .

25 KrepsSarah, ‘Multilateral military interventions: Theory and practice’, Political Science Quarterly, 123:4 (2008), pp. 573603 .

26 SlaterJerome, ‘The limits of legitimization in international organizations: the organization of American states and the Dominican crisis’, International Organization, 23:1 (1969), pp. 4872 .

27 The OAS condemned the Panama intervention in a 20:1 vote. See GoshkoJohn M. and IsikoffMichael, ‘OAS votes to censure U.S. for intervention’, Washington Post (23 December 1989).

28 See, for example, Risse-KappenThomas, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

29 On the Balkans, see BurgSteven L., ‘Coercive diplomacy in the Balkans: the U.S. use of force in Bosnia and Kosovo’, in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (eds), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003). On the Iraq War, see GordonPhilip H. and ShapiroJeremy, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), pp. 136141 .

30 Grossman, author interview, Washington, DC, 13 January 2011.

31 See, for example, VincentR. J., Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); and BullHedley (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

32 Bull, Intervention in World Politics, p. 195. See also JacksonRobert, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 278293 .

33 KeohaneRobert O. and MartinLisa L., ‘The promise of institutionalist theory’, International Security, 20:1 (1995), pp. 3951 .

34 JervisRobert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 6277 .

35 On the importance of multilateral approval for signalling benign intentions, see ThompsonAlexander, ‘Coercion through IOs: the Security Council and the logic of information transmission’, International Organization, 60:1 (2006), pp. 134 .

36 CameronDavid, ObamaBarack, and SarkozyNicolas, ‘The bombing continues until Gaddafi goes’, The Times (London) (15 April 2011).

37 StewartCatrina, ‘Russia accuses NATO of “expanding” UN Libya resolution’, The Independent (4 July 2011). For a useful discussion, see also HenriksenDag and LarssenAnn Katrin (eds), Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 4.

38 AyoobMohammed, ‘Humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty’, International Journal of Human Rights, 6:1 (2002), p. 92 .

39 For similar arguments, which, however, do not explore the causal mechanism in detail, see Farer, ‘Legitimate intervention’, pp. 324–6; and DoyleMichael W., ‘The ethics of multilateral intervention’, Theoria, 109 (April 2006), pp. 4142 .

40 Terry Nardin explains that ‘the “cause” that makes a given action “just” is its end or purpose – defending the innocent from violence, for example’. Cf. Nardin, ‘Introduction’, in Nardin and Williams (eds), Humanitarian Intervention, p. 10.

41 Ibid., pp. 9–11.

42 See, for example, Walzer, Politics of Rescue, pp. 59–60; SteinMark S., ‘Unauthorized humanitarian intervention’, Social Philosophy and Policy, 21:1 (2004), p. 31 ; and Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 159–60.

43 AllisonRoy, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 155158 .

44 MurphySean, Humanitarian Intervention: the United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), pp. 108111 .

45 CortellAndrew P. and DavisJames W., ‘How do international institutions matter? The domestic impact of international norms and rules’, International Studies Quarterly, 40:4 (1996), pp. 451487 ; KrauseJoachim, ‘Multilateralism: Behind European views’, Washington Quarterly, 27:2 (2004), pp. 4359 .

46 TagoAtsushi, ‘Determinants of multilateralism in U.S. use of force’, Journal of Peace Research, 42:5 (2005), pp. 585604 ; RecchiaStefano, ‘Why seek international organisation approval under unipolarity? Averting issue linkage vs. appeasing Congress’, International Relations, 30:1 (2016), pp. 78101 .

47 Thompson, ‘Coercion through IOs’. See also VoetenErik, ‘The political origins of the UN Security Council’s ability to legitimize the use of force’, International Organization, 59:3 (2005), pp. 527557 .

48 On accidental abuse in the context of humanitarian intervention, see Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 58.

49 HabermasJürgen, The Divided West (London: Polity, 2006), p. 184 . See also DobosNed, ‘Is U.N. Security Council authorisation for armed humanitarian intervention morally necessary?’, Philosophia, 38:3 (2010), pp. 499515 .

50 JervisRobert, ‘Bridges, barriers, and gaps: Research and policy’, Political Psychology, 29:4 (2008), pp. 578579 .

51 JanisIrving L., Groupthink (rev. edn, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). See also BadieDina, ‘Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US policy shift toward Iraq’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 6:4 (2010), pp. 277296 .

52 Jervis, ‘Bridges, barriers, and gaps’, pp. 580–1.

53 See WelshJennifer and ZaumDominik, ‘Legitimation and the UN Security Council’, in D. Zaum (ed.), Legitimating International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 7680 .

54 Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia–Herzegovina, pp. 307–59. The Sarajevo market bombing of 28 August 1995 remained shrouded in controversy: several authors surmise that the Bosnian Muslims may have engineered the shelling of their own ethnic kin, precisely to trigger an international intervention against Serb forces. See, for example, BeloffNora, Yugoslavia: An Avoidable War (London: New European Publications, 1997), p. 112 ; and ParentiMichael, To Kill a Nation: the Attack on Yugoslavia (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 7576 . In 2007, however, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded after examining all the evidence that Bosnian Serb units were almost certainly responsible for the market shelling, thus validating the initial assessment of UN ballistic experts. See ICTY, ‘PROSECUTOR v. DRAGOMIR MILOSEVIC’, Case No. IT-98–29/1-T, 12 December 2007, p. 241, para. 724, and pp. 220–41 more generally, available at: {http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf} accessed 29 July 2016.

55 BellamyAlex J., Kosovo and International Society (London: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 114116 . Some authors have questioned whether the killing of a few dozen ethnic Albanians in the village of Racak in early 1999, which provided a major impetus for intervention, should count as a ‘civilian massacre’, as it seems likely that several of the individuals killed on that occasion were rebel fighters. See, for example, JohnstoneDiana, Fool’s Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions (London: Pluto, 2002), pp. 241243 ; WolfgramMark A., ‘Democracy and propaganda: NATO’s War in Kosovo’, European Journal of Communication, 23:2 (2008), pp. 153171 . However, the weight of the evidence subsequently assembled by independent international authorities suggests that at Racak, as well as more generally during the run-up to the Kosovo intervention, Serb security forces failed to adequately discriminate between rebel forces and innocent civilians, which, while often difficult, remains a key marker of legitimate counterinsurgency campaigns. ICTY, ‘PROSECUTOR v. MILAN MILUTINOVIĆ et al.’, Case No. IT-05–87-T, 26 February 2009, vol. 1, pp. 324–48, available at: {http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tjug/en/jud090226-e1of4.pdf} accessed 29 July 2016.

56 HalberstamDavid, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Touchstone, 2001), pp. 196197 ; RecchiaStefano, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors: U.S. Civil-Military Relations and Multilateral Intervention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), pp. 116118 .

57 AlbrightMadeleine, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax, 2003), p. 177 . As early as April 1993, the NGO Helsinki Watch (precursor to Human Rights Watch) reported that ‘Bosnian Muslim and Croatian troops have forced the displacement of Serbs in southwestern and central Bosnia’ and ‘Muslim forces have summarily executed civilians and disarmed combatants in Eastern Bosnia’. See WatchHelsinki, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (New York, 1993), pp. 12 , 14.

58 AlbrightMadeleine, ‘Options for Bosnia’, memorandum for the National Security Adviser (14 April 1993), available at: {http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12326} accessed 29 July 2016.

59 Recchia, Reassuring the Reluctant Warriors, pp. 159–61. See also DaalderIvo and O’HanlonMichael, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 30 .

60 Clinton writes that he ‘didn’t want to divide the NATO alliance by unilaterally bombing Serb military positions’. See Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004), p. 513 . See also Recchia, Reluctant Warriors, pp. 120–38 (on Bosnia) and pp. 162–77 (on Kosovo).

61 KirkpatrickDavid and FahimKareem, ‘Qaddafi warns of assault on Benghazi as U.N. vote nears’, New York Times (17 March 2011).

62 KupermanAlan J., ‘A model humanitarian intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya campaign’, International Security, 38:1 (2011), p. 110 .

63 Kirkpatrick and Fahim, ‘Qaddafi warns of assault on Benghazi’.

64 RiddellKelly and ShapiroJeffrey Scott, ‘Hillary Clinton’s “WMD” moment: U.S. intelligence saw false narrative in Libya’, Washington Times (29 January 2015).

65 FitzgeraldDavid and RyanDavid, Obama, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Dilemmas of Intervention (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 99104 .

66 Henriksen and Larssen, Rationale and Consequences of War in Libya, chs 2–6.

67 See, for example, WaxmanMatthew C., Intervention to Stop Genocide and Mass Atrocities: International Norms and U.S. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009).

68 KupermanAlan J., ‘The moral hazard of humanitarian intervention: Lessons from the Balkans’, International Studies Quarterly, 52:1 (2008), p. 51 . See also RowlandsDane and CarmentDavid, ‘Moral hazard and conflict intervention’, in Murray Wolfson (ed.), The Political Economy of War and Peace (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998); and CrawfordTimothy W., ‘Moral hazard, intervention and internal war: a conceptual analysis’, Ethnopolitics, 4:2 (2005), pp. 175193 .

69 BelloniRoberto, ‘The tragedy of Darfur and the limits of the “Responsibility to Protect”,’ Ethnopolitics, 5:4 (2006), pp. 327346 ; BelloniRoberto, ‘The trouble with humanitarianism’, Review of International Studies, 33:2 (2007), pp. 459461 .

70 See also KyddAndrew H. and StrausScott, ‘The road to hell? Third-party intervention to prevent atrocities’, American Journal of Political Science, 57:3 (2013), pp. 673684 .

71 WesternJon, ‘Illusions of moral hazard: a conceptual and empirical critique’, Ethnopolitics, 4:2 (2005), pp. 225236 ; BellamyAlex J. and WilliamsPaul D., ‘On the limits of moral hazard: the “Responsibility to Protect”, armed conflict and mass atrocities’, European Journal of International Relations, 18:3 (2011), pp. 539571 .

72 Bellamy and Williams (‘On the limits of moral hazard’, pp. 549–50) find that rebellions have generally been shorter since the rise of humanitarian intervention norms after 1990, which they claim disproves the argument that a higher likelihood of intervention prolongs rebel violence. Observed changes in the duration of rebellions, however, may be due simply to the end of Cold War proxy wars and related superpower funding. The authors’ inference would be warranted only if their findings held up after limiting the sample to post-Cold War cases in which humanitarian intervention was in fact seriously considered.

73 US National Security Council, ‘Deputies Committee Meeting on Kosovo’, Summary of Conclusions (26 October 1998), available at: {http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16197} accessed 29 July 2016.

74 PetritschWolfgang and PichlerRobert, Kosovo-Kosova: Der Lange Weg zum Frieden (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 2004), p. 148 . See also GibbsDavid, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009), ch. 7.

75 Belloni, ‘Tragedy of Darfur’, p. 226.

76 Kuperman, ‘Model humanitarian intervention?’, pp. 110–13.

77 Ibid., p. 124. See also LarisonDaniel, ‘Libyan ceasefire and the moral hazard of intervention’, The American Conservative (18 March 2011).

78 KupermanAlan J., ‘Mitigating the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention: Lessons from economics’, Global Governance, 14:2 (2008), p. 228 .

79 Ibid., pp. 229–31.

80 See UN General Assembly, ‘World Summit Outcome’, Sixtieth Session, A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), § 139.

81 For a similar argument, see DoyleMichael W., The Question of Intervention (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), p. 23 .

82 AuerswaldDavid P. and CowheyPeter F., ‘Ballotbox diplomacy: the war powers resolution and the use of force’, International Studies Quarterly, 41:3 (1997), pp. 505528 .

83 BusbyJoshua, MontenJonathan, TamaJordan, and InbodenWilliam, ‘Congress is already post-partisan’, Foreign Affairs (28 January 2013), available at: {https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-01-28/congress-already-post-partisan} accessed 27 July 2016; Recchia, ‘Why seek international organisation approval?’

84 See, for example, UK House of Commons, ‘Working with International Organisations’, Select Committee on Defence, Seventh Report, Part 3 (18 March 2010), available at: {http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmdfence/224/22406.htm} accessed 30 July 2016; and SorensonDavid S. and WoodPia Christina (eds), The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-cold War Era (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

85 KrepsSarah, ‘Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: Why public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 6:3 (2010), pp. 191215 ; Recchia, ‘Why seek international organisation approval?’, p. 83.

86 Wedgwood, ‘Unilateral action in a multilateral world’, p. 173; Thompson, ‘Coercion through IOs’.

87 Claude, ‘Collective legitimization’; Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, pp. 80–2.

88 RichterPaul, ‘U.S. enlists more countries in Iraq, at taxpayers’ expense’, Los Angeles Times (22 June 2007); BlanchardChristopher and DaleCatherine Marie, ‘Iraq: Foreign contributions to stabilization and reconstruction’, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: 26 December 2007).

89 ChristoffJoseph, ‘Stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq: Coalition support and international donor commitments’, Testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight (Washington, DC: 9 May 2007); Blanchard and Dale, ‘Iraq: Foreign contributions’, pp. 11–18.

90 ZelenyJeff and HulseCarl, ‘Senate supports a pullout date in Iraq War bill’, New York Times (28 March 2007); Norton-TaylorRichard, ‘Out by June: UK plans Iraq withdrawal’, The Guardian (10 December 2008).

91 WoehrelSteven, ‘Future of the Balkans and U.S. policy concerns’, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: 13 May 2009); CimbalaStephen J. and ForsterPeter K., Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010).

92 TalbottStrobe, The Great Experiment (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p. 302 .

93 ParisRoland, ‘The “Responsibility to Protect” and the structural problems of preventive humanitarian intervention’, International Peacekeeping, 21:5 (2014), p. 585 . See also Kuperman, ‘Model humanitarian intervention?’, pp. 125–8.

94 Barack Obama, interview with Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times (8 August 2014).

95 Stein, ‘Unauthorized humanitarian intervention’, p. 33. See also Franck, ‘Legality and legitimacy’, pp. 143–4; Tesón, ‘The vexing problem of authority’, p. 766.

96 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 100–5 and 13–36. Finnemore (Purpose of Intervention, p. 73) argues that ‘strong humanitarian claims were certainly credible’ in these two cases. On the Uganda intervention, see also TesónFernando R., Humanitarian Intervention: an Inquiry into Law and Morality (2nd edn, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997), pp. 179195 .

97 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 81.

98 Ibid., p. 114.

99 ChandlerDavid, ‘Foreign interventions in Cambodia, 1806–2003’, in William J. Lahneman (ed.), Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

100 On casualty figures, see, respectively, Global Security, ‘The War in the Bush’, available at: {http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/uganda3.htm} accessed 27 July 2016; and Amnesty International, ‘Human Rights in Uganda’ (June 1978), p. 13, available at: {http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR59/012/1982/en/} accessed 28 July 2016.

101 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 299.

102 On Darfur, see HamiltonRebecca, Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), ch. 6. On Syria, see Fitzgerald and Ryan, Obama and the Dilemmas of Intervention, ch. 6.

103 GoldbergJeffrey, ‘The Obama doctrine’, The Atlantic, 317:3 (April 2016), p. 73 .

104 On incentives to Russia, see BakerJames A., The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995), pp. 294295 and 287–313 more generally. On China, see CrossleyNoële, Multilateralism versus Unilateralism: the Relevance of the United Nations in a Unipolar World (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 73 .

105 For a discussion, see RecchiaStefano, ‘Did Chirac say “non”? Revisiting UN diplomacy on Iraq, 2002–03’, Political Science Quarterly, 130:4 (2015), pp. 625654 .

106 See, for example, Tesón, ‘The vexing problem of authority’, p. 766.

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