It is rather surprising to note how slow the discipline of international relations was to recognize the importance of ethnic groups as a significant factor in world politics. Whereas there were numerous works in the inter-war period that dealt with the ‘minorities problem’ for over two decades since 1945 this Issue was ignored by most, if not all, of the standard texts on international relations.

Since the early 1970s, South Africa has become an increasingly important issue within US foreign policy after a long period of benign neglect. For a considerable part of the post-war period, US decision-makers felt it possible to avoid a direct confrontation with the moral and ethical issues involved in the South African government's policy of apartheid; the relative geographical isolation of the country from many central theatres of East–West conflict in central Europe, the Middle East and South East Asia ensured that South Africa was not in the front line of strategically vital states. Furthermore, South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth until 1960 meant that, for many US policy makers, South Africa could be seen as an issue within Commonwealth relations and thus not one for direct US involvement.

There are two popular claims about diplomacy in the modern history of international relations. According to the first, World War One constituted a decisive turning point in the modern era, marking the emergence of a new diplomacy, distinct in both essence and style from that which had existed previously. The second maintains that diplomacy is in a state of continuous decline. This study proposes that the distinction between old and new diplomacy is simplistic and inaccurate, and that the argument regarding the decline of diplomacy is not a valid one, Raymond Aron's observation that ‘diplomacy, in the traditional sense of the term, functions up to a certain degree between allies, but hardly any longer among enemies, or even between the blocs and the neutral nations’ is only partially correct, and reflects its time of writing at the height of the cold war.

Normative international theory addresses the moral dimension of international society and the logic of ‘ought’ statements in international relations. The traditional content of normative international theory has been dominated by such issues as: the nature of international law and the moral basis of the rights and duties it imposes on states and individuals; the ethics of pacifism and the theory of the 6just war’ the morality of intervention; and, most fundamentally, the nature of the ethical requirements that need to be met if a system of inter-state relations can justly be characterized as an ‘international society’. While such issues have never disappeared from academic study, the dominant modes of international relations theorizing in the 1960s and 1970s—whether realist, neo-realist, pluralist or structuralist—were at one, if for different reasons? in keeping them at the bottom of the agenda paper. And yet, the 1980s has seen a revival of normative international theory. The reasons for this renewal of interest are two-fold. On the one hand, the traditional agenda of normative theory, as outlined above, has never lost its salience in the real world even if unfashionable in academia; since it is in the nature of fashions to change some sort of revival of interest in the old questions was to be expected. But of rather more importance has been the emergence of a new range of normative issues: demands from the ‘south’ for a New International Economic Order have placed the politics of redistribution on the international agenda for the first time—revisionist states in the 1980s no longer make territorial demands but appeal to status quo oriented states to make concessions on the basis of economic justice. In today's world normative statements are as likely to be about the debt crisis as they are to be about the conduct of the Gulf War or the US intervention in Grenada. Mainstream international relations theory has generally refused to ask or answer moral questions, but this strategy of avoidance has not succeeded. Questions such as ‘what ought to be our attitude to poverty in the South?’ or ‘how ought the world' financial system respond to the debt problems of Brazil or Zambia?’ cannot be wished away—as anyone who has taught international political economy will be well aware. Normative theory cannot answer questions like this but it can help each individual to provide his or her own response—and no more important task exists for the discipline of international relations.

1. The charges against Churchill

Did Mr Churchill, Britain's wartime Prime Minister, display ‘cavalier behaviour5 towards his Cabinet over The Atlantic Charter9 of 1941? Having decided ‘to ignore’ their views, did he somehow seek to ensure, ‘rather ineptly’, that crucial telegrams should conceal his deviousness?

Dr A. P. Dobson makes these accusations in this Review in April 1984,] They relate to ‘RIVIERA’, Churchill’s first wartime meeting with President Roosevelt, between 9 and 12 August 1941 in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Concerned primarily with wartime collaboration, though the United States was not yet formally a belligerent, the two leaders outlined peace aims in a hastily drafted joint declaration, promptly named ‘The Atlantic Charter’. Their fierce debate over its fourth economic ‘Point’ reflected American pressure to secure advantage from assistance, under the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, to Britain's war effort.

The 'special relationship', wrapped in politically relevant fact and myth, in nostalgia and irritation, can still raise emotions. Books and essays about it bring on their trans-Atlantic and domestic controversies; it remains a case of reviewer beware.