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COUNTERFACTUALS AND PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM

  • PETER FRITZ (a1) and JEREMY GOODMAN (a2)
Abstract
Abstract

This article explores the connection between two theses: the principle of conditional excluded middle for the counterfactual conditional, and the claim that it is a contingent matter which (coarse grained) propositions there are. Both theses enjoy wide support, and have been defended at length by Robert Stalnaker. We will argue that, given plausible background assumptions, these two principles are incompatible, provided that conditional excluded middle is understood in a certain modalized way. We then show that some (although not all) arguments for conditional excluded middle can in fact be extended to motivate this modalized version of the principle.

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Corresponding author
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, CLASSICS, HISTORY OF ART AND IDEAS UNIVERSITY OF OSLO POSTBOKS 1020 BLINDERN 0315 OSLO, NORWAY E-mail: peter.fritz@ifikk.uio.no
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 3709 TROUSDALE PARKWAY LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, USA 90089 E-mail: jeremy.goodman@usc.edu
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The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • ISSN: 1755-0203
  • EISSN: 1755-0211
  • URL: /core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic
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