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ON TRUTH-FUNCTIONALITY

  • DANIEL J. HILL (a1) and STEPHEN K. McLEOD (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755020310000274
  • Published online: 18 November 2010
Abstract

Benjamin Schnieder has argued that several traditional definitions of truth-functionality fail to capture a central intuition informal characterizations of the notion often capture. The intuition is that the truth-value of a sentence that employs a truth-functional operator depends upon the truth-values of the sentences upon which the operator operates. Schnieder proposes an alternative definition of truth-functionality that is designed to accommodate this intuition. We argue that one traditional definition of ‘truth-functionality’ is immune from the counterexamples that Schnieder proposes and is preferable to Schnieder’s alternative.

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*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL, 7 ABERCROMBY SQUARE, LIVERPOOL L69 7WY, UNITED KINGDOM. E-mail:djhill@liv.ac.uk, skmcleod@liv.ac.uk
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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

D. Edgington (1995). On conditionals. Mind, 104, 235329.

P. Tomassi (1999). Logic. London: Routledge.

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The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • ISSN: 1755-0203
  • EISSN: 1755-0211
  • URL: /core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic
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