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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Confronted with the enigma of revolutionary Russia, Imperial Germany vacillated between a policy of official cooperation and one of counterrevolutionary intervention after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In search of the reasons for this ambivalence, Western scholars have explored the ironies of the “unholy alliance” between Kaiser and commissar. Somewhat embarrassed for owing their survival to German autocracy, Soviet writers have praised Lenin’s cleverness in exploiting the contradictions within the imperialist camp. In West Germany, after decades of complacent anticommunism, Fritz Fischer in his Griff nach der Weltmacht has charged that rapacious Wilhelmian war aims “found their logical fulfillment in Brest-Litovsk and its supplementary treaties”.
1. Freund, Gerald, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (London and New York, 1957)Google Scholar; Carr, E. H., German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Baltimore, 1951)Google Scholar; Kochan, Lionel, Russia and the Weimar Republic (Cambridge, 1954)Google Scholar; and Zeman, Z. A. B., The Gentlemen Negotiators (New York, 1971)Google Scholar.
2. Kobliakov, I. K., Von Brest bis Rapallo (Berlin, 1956)Google Scholar; Briunin, V. G., “Sovetskogermanskie otnosheniia nakanune Noiabr'skoi revoliutsii,” in Kul'bakin, V. D., Noiabr'skaia revoliutsiia v Germanii (Moscow, 1960)Google Scholar; and Achtamzian, A. A., Ot Bresta do Kilia (Moscow, 1963)Google Scholar.
3. Fischer, Fritz, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf, 1961; rev. ed., 1964), pp. 752 ff.Google Scholar; trans, and abr. as Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), pp. 563 ff. For the subsequent controversy see Geiss, Imanuel, Der polnische Grenzstreifen, 1914-1918 (Lüibeck, 1960)Google Scholar; Janssen, K. H., Macht und Verblendung: Kriegszielpolitik der deutschen Bundesstaaten, 1914-1918 (Güttingen, 1963)Google Scholar; Mann, Bernhard, Die baltischen Länder in der deutschen Kriegszielpublizistik, 1914-1918 (Tübingen, 1965)Google Scholar; Linde, Gerd, Die deutsche Politik in Litauen im Ersten Weltkrieg (Wiesbaden, 1964)Google Scholar; and Fritz T. Epstein’s interpretative essays, “Die deutsche Ostpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 10 (1962): 381-94, and “Neue Literatur zur Geschichte der Ostpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 14 (1966): 63-94.
4. Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, vol. 4: Die Herrschaft des deulschen Militarismus und die Katastrophe von 1918 (Munich, 1968), pp. 316 ff. See also Graf Lynar, Ernst W., Deutsche Kriegsziele, 1914-1918 (Frankfurt, 1964)Google Scholar; Joll, James, “The 1914 Debate Continues,” Past and Present, 34 (1966): 100 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Die deutschen Kriegszielpolitik, 1914-1918: Bemerkungen zum Stand der Diskussion,” in Kriegsausbruch, 1914, German book edition of the Journal of Contemporary History (Munich, 1967), pp. 60-100; and Schieder, Wolfgang, Erster Weltkrieg: Ursachen, Entstehung und Kriegsziele (Colognc, 1969).Google Scholar
5. Baumgart, Winfried, Deutsche Ostpolitik, 1918: Von Brest-Litowsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges (Vienna and Munich, 1966)Google Scholar; idem, Von Brest-Litowsk zur deutschen Novemberrevolution: Aus den Tagebüchern, Briefen und Aufzeichnungen Alfons Paquets, Wilhelm Groeners und Albert Hopmans, März bis November 1918 (Göttingen, 1970); together with Repgen, Konrad, eds., Brest-Litowsk (Göttingen, 1969)Google Scholar; and the most revealing subtle apologia, “Brest-Litowsk und Versailles: Ein Vergleich zweier Friedensschlüsse,” Historische Zeitschrift, 210 (1970): 583-619. For Baumgart's articles not cited in the subsequent notes see “Ludendorff und das Auswärtige Amt zur Besetzung der Krim 1918,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 14 (1966): 529-38; “Neue Quellen zur Beurteilung Ludendorffs,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1969, no. 2, pp. 161-77; and “Unternehmen ‘Schlusstein, ’” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 19 (1969): 112-16, 172-76, 217-31, 285-91, 331-55, 411-41, 457-77.
6. Basler, Werner, Deutschlands Annexionspolitik in Polen und im Baltikum, 1914-1918 (Berlin, 1963) Google Scholar; Autorenkollektiv, , Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen von den Verhandlungen in Brest-Litowsk bis zum Abschluss des Rapallovertrages (Berlin, 1967), vol. 1 Google Scholar; Gutsche, Willibald, Klein, Fritz, Kral, Helmut, Petzold, Joachim, “Neue Forschungen zur Geschichte Deutschlands im ersten Weltkrieg,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1967), pp. 282–306 Google Scholar; and Petzold, Joachim, Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1969), vol. 3.Google Scholar
7. For permission to use the diary of her father I would like to thank Mrs. M. White. All quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from it. Although they were taken sporadically, Riezler’s notes are corroborated to a surprising degree by the official diplomatic correspondence in the German Foreign Office, cited as AA with the appropriate number, Russland 61 (allgemeines), vols. 151-61, Deutschland 131 (Beziehungen zu Russland), vols. 33-46, and Deutschland 131 secreta, vols. 18 ff. The Nachlass of Foreign Secretary Kühlmann has been destroyed, and the Hintze papers are disappointing. Professor K. D. Erdmann is currently preparing an edition of the diaries. See his essay, “Zur Beurteilung Bethmann Hollwegs,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 15 (1964): 525-40; and Stern’s, Fritz “Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility,” in Krieger, L. and Stern, F., eds., The Responsibility of Power (Garden City, 1967), pp. 252-85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
8. Riezler’s theoretical writings are Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen: Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der Politik und zu anderen Theorien (Munich, 1913), and under the pseudonym Ruedorffer, J. J., Grundzüge der Weltpolitik der Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 1914)Google Scholar. For an analysis of their ideas see Andreas Hillgruber, “Riezler's Theorie des kalkulierten Risikos und Bethmann Hollweg’s politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914,” Historische Zeitschrift, 202 (1966): 333-51, and my own article, “The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s Calculated Risk, July 1914,” Central European History, 2 (1969): 48-76.
9. Riezler diary, Stockholm, Jan. 14, 24, Feb. 11; “On the way to Berlin,” Jan. 29; Berlin, Apr. 15, 1918. See his comment on the Brest talks: “Kühlmann faces immense difficulties with a public opinion incapable of negotiating behind him, confronted with the half-mad Bolsheviks and flanked by General von Hoffmann on one side and Czernin on the other side.” For his Stockholm mission see also Zeman, Z. A. B., Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918 (London, 1958), pp. 81, 89, 108, and passim.Google Scholar
10. Riezler diary, Moscow, Apr. 24, May 11, June 8, 1918. “Strange people,” he said. “Idealism and corruption abound around us.” One of the officers attached to the legation, Major K. Bothmer, considered Riezler “a man with gifts considerably above the average and with a comprehensive Bildung,” and concluded: “The political work seems to lie almost exclusively in the hands of Dr. Riezler, who is reputed to have special insight into Eastern politics.” See Mit Graf Mirbach in Moskau (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 21-22. For the military reaction to the Bolsheviks see Baumgart, Winfried, “Die militärpolitischen Berichte des Freiherrn von Keyserlingk aus Petersburg, Januar-Februar 1918,” Vierteljahrshejte für Zeitgeschichte, 15 (1967): 87–104.Google Scholar
11. Eyewitness accounts of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets are Lockhart, Robert Bruce, Memoirs of a British Agent (London, 1932), pp. 291 ff.Google Scholar; Philips Price, M., Die russische Revolution: Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1917-1919 (Hamburg, 1921), pp. 406 ff.Google Scholar; and Sadoul, Jacques, Notes sur la révolution bolchévique (Paris, 1919), pp. 393 ffGoogle Scholar. On August 28 Riezler recalled in his diary: “The sessions in the Bolshoi Theater: the meeting with Kamkov on stage and his embarrassment. In the grand duke’s box: Spiridonova speaking for half an hour: ‘Bombs shall fly!’ Dried up woman.” For the background to Left S.R. discontent see Radkey, O. H., The Sickle Under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist Revolution in the Early Months of Soviet Rule (New York, 1963)Google Scholar; Gusev, K. V., Krakh partii levykh eserov (Moscow, 1963)Google Scholar; and Steinberg, I. N., In the Workshop of the Revolution (New York, 1953).Google Scholar
12. Riezler to Bergen (private letter), June 24, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 42. See also Mirbach’s recommendations in Winfried Baumgart, “Die Mission des Grafen Mirbach in Moskau, April-Juni 1918,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 16 (1968): 66-96, and his unpublished telegrams of June 3, 5, 13, 14, and 25, in Dld 131, vols. 40 ff., Dld 131 secr., vol. 18, and Rld 61, vols. 151 ff. Riezler diary, Apr. 24, May 11, June 8, and Aug. 17, 1918: “If this continues we abandon the political terrain to the Entente and give up future possibilities.” For the Ukrainian question see AA Rld 61, vols. 149 ff.; Beyer, H, “Die Mittelmächte und die Ukraine 1918,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, supp. no. 2 (Munich, 1956)Google Scholar; and Baumgart, Winfried, “General Groener und die deutsche Besatzungspolitik in der Ukraine 1918,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 21 (1970): 325-40.Google Scholar
13. Mirbach to Foreign Office, June 25, 1918, AA Dld 131 secr., vol. 18, and Riezler diary, June 8 and Aug. 17, 1918. For the military observers’ advocacy of intervention see Bothmer, Mit Mirbach, pp. 65 ff.; Schubert, W. W., Der Zweite Weltkrieg hat 1918 begonnen (Munich, 1957)Google Scholar; Stadtler, Eduard, Als politischer Soldat, 1914-1918 (Düsseldorf, 1936), pp. 129-30Google Scholar; and the reminiscences of the chief of the German press bureau, Paquet, Alfons, 1m kommunistischen Rnssland (Jena, 1919), pp. 16 ffGoogle Scholar.
14. Kühlmann’s rationale is in his decisive telegram to Lersner favoring cooperation, Dec. 3, 1917, AA Dld 131 secr., vol. 17, reiterated to Lersner as late as July 3, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 42. See also his Erinnerungen (Heidelberg, 1948), pp. 546 ff. For the struggle between the Supreme Command and the Chancellery over intervention see Ludendorff’s letter of June 9 and Hertling’s answer on June 22, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 40, and K. A. Hertling, , Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei (Freiburg, 1919)Google Scholar versus Ludendorff, Erich, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 1914-1918 (Berlin, 1919), pp. 526 ff.Google Scholar
15. Riezler diary, June 8, Aug. 17, 1918: “If politics ever was navigating on uncharted seas, this is now the case. Since Skoropadsky, the course begun with Brest has been deflected irrevocably. There remains only sooner or later the restoration of Russia or dancing from moment to moment while one can break one’s neck at any time.” See also Rosenfeld, Günter, Sowjetrussland und Deutschland, 1917-1922 (Berlin, 1960), pp. 93 ff.Google Scholar, and Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 208 ff.
16. On August 28, 1918, Riezler committed the circumstances of the assassination to his diary from memory. Generally agreeing with his own deposition of July 7 and the account of Lieutenant Müller of July 7 on “the course of the assassination of July 6, 1918, in the German embassy,” his notes contain a cryptic reference on “my conversations before the murder with Karakhan and Dzerzhinsky about the warnings” as well as the names “Weinberg, Hintzsch” of the agents involved. See also Kühlmann to William II, July 6, 1918, and the latter’s marginalia on an article of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of the following day: “Mirbach’s death must be exploited thoroughly against the Entente at home and abroad by our propaganda… You have done it … ! From this the neutrals and our people must learn.” The correspondence surrounding the crime is in AA Rld 31k, Ermordung des Grafen Mirbach.
17. Riezler diary, Aug. 28, 1918. Kühlmann to Grünau, July 6, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 42. Bothmer, Mit Mirbach, pp. 70 ff.; Paquet, Im kommunistischen Russland, pp. 24ff.; Hilger, Gustav and Meyer, A. G., The Incompatible Allies (New York, 1953), pp. 1 ff.Google Scholar; von Blülcher, Wipert, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo (Wiesbaden, 1951), pp. 16 ff.Google Scholar; and Nowak, K. F., ed., Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors Max von Hoffmann (Berlin, 1929), 2: 200 ff.Google Scholar, with the typical diary entry: “According to my opinion the Entente together with the Kadets stand behind the crime [the shooting of Count Mirbach]. They hope to cause a resumption of the hostilities between Germany and Russia. I consider it impossible that the Bolsheviks are somehow involved.” For the reaction of the Western diplomats see Verstraete, Maurice, Mes cahiers russes (Paris, 1920), pp. 339 ff.Google Scholar; Robien, Louis de, Journal d’un diplomate en Russie, 1917-1918 (Paris, 1921), pp. 304–5 Google Scholar; and Price, Die russische Revolution, pp. 410-11,
18. Lockhart, British Agent, pp. 290 ff. The following account is taken from a barrage of Riezler telegrams to the Foreign Office, July 7 ff., AA Rld 31k. See also the daily General Staff reports on the “domestic situation of Russia,” July 7 ff., in AA Rld 61, vol. 158. See also Gusev’s chapter “Miatezh levykh eserov,” in Krakh, pp. 191-216; F. Gladkov, “Petushinyi zagovor,” Molodoi Kommunist, December 1967, pp. 48-53; L. Spirin, “Razgrom miatezha levykh eserov v Moskve 6-7 iiulia 1918 goda,” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal, 1968, no. 8, pp. 38-47. Of the older literature see Bonch-Bruevich, V. D., Ubiistvo germanskogo posla Mirbakha i vosstanie levykh eserov (Moscow, 1927)Google Scholar; Hard, William, Raymond Robins’ Own Story (New York and London, 1920), pp. 180 ff.Google Scholar; and Bunyan, John, ed., Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia, April-December 1918 (Baltimore, 1936), pp. 197 ffGoogle Scholar.
19. A spate of Bussche telegrams to Grünau July 8 ff., forwarding Riezler’s latest news to the emperor, AA Rld 31k. Cf. Sadoul, Notes sur la révolution, pp. 402 ff.; Price, Die russische Revolution, pp. 413 ff.; and Ross, E. A., The Russian Soviet Republic (New York, 1923), pp. 70 ffGoogle Scholar. See also “Likvidatsiia levoeserovskogo miatezha v Moskve v 1918 g.,” in Krasnyi arkhiv, 1940, no. 4, pp. 101 ff., and I. Vatsetis, “Vystuplenie levykh eserov v Moskve,” in Etapy bol'shogo puti (Moscow, 1963).
20. Bussche to Grünau, July 6; Bussche to Lersner, July 7; Joffe to Kühlmann, July 6, AA Bonn, Dld 131, vol. 42, and Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Moscow, 1959), 1: 380 ft. See also Iz istorii VChK, 1914-1917 (Moscow, 19S8), pp. 146 ff.; Lenin, V. I., Sochineniia, 35 vols., 4th ed. (Moscow, 1941-50), 27: 492 ff.Google Scholar, and Chicherin, G. V., “Vneshniaia politika Sovetskoi Rossii za dva goda,” in Vospominaniia o Lenine (Moscow, 1957), 2: 166 ffGoogle Scholar. For the lack of clarity compare Bussche (Riezler) to Grünau, July 10, 1918: “Because of the close connection between the Left S.R.’s and the Bolsheviks in government, one cannot suppress the suspicion that several Bolsheviks also helped the escape” of the assassins. Hence Riezler asked for “the immediate sending of an experienced detective fluent in Russian,” AA Rld 31k and Dld 131, vol. 42.
21. Katkov, George, “The Assassination of Count Mirbach,” Soviet Affairs, 3 (1962): 53–93 Google Scholar (St. Antony's Papers, no. 12), quotation on p. 91. Based on Trotsky’s Diary in Exile, 1935 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), Ivanov-Razumnik's, Tiur'my i ssylki (New York, 1953)Google Scholar, and Salomon’s, G. A. Sredi krasnykh vozhdei (Paris, 1930)Google Scholar, Katkov argues: “Mirbach’s revealed or suspected duplicity in his dealings with the Soviet rulers must have made the decision to eliminate him a much easier one than the passing of the death sentence on the children and servants of the Imperial family” (pp. 91-92). Picked up by Stefan Possony, T., Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary (Chicago, 1964), pp. 282 ff.Google Scholar, Payne, Robert, The Life and Death of Lenin (New York, 1964), pp. 463-64, Google Scholar and in muted form by Ulam, Adam B., The Bolsheviks (New York, 1965), pp. 423 ff.Google Scholar, this conspirational thesis suffers from one major contradiction. How could Lenin be sure that the German interventionist party would not be strengthened by the crime? Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 224 ff., hedges his bet. However fascinating it may be to speculate on who originated the crime, it is evident that the German government did not regard Lenin as the culprit.
22. Riezler diary, Aug. 28, 1918. Bussche to Riezler, July 11, AA Dld 131, vol. 42: “If the S.R’s seize power in Moscow and do not come to terms with us, I consider the following useful: First, a military advance from Finland against Murmansk and Archangel; second, the occupation of Petersburg and a move toward Vologda,” that is, a pro-Bolshevik military intervention against the Entente forces and embassies. “I do not yet consider the time ripe for the bourgeois parties. They are officers without soldiers, since the masses are not tired enough of the disorder.” See also Paquet, Im kommunistischen Russland, pp. 31-32, and the articles in the Vossische Zeitung and Tägliche Rundschau, July 7; Der Tag, July 8; Neue Freie Presse, July 10; Hamburger Nachrichten, July 12; and Frankfurter Zeitung, July 16—all of which downplayed the crime and attributed it to the Entente.
23. Riezler diary, Aug. 28, 1918. Kühlmann to Grūnau, July 6, 1918; Lersner to Hertling, July 10, 1918; AA Rld 31k; Lersner to Foreign Office, Bussche to Lersner, July 11, 1918, AA Dld 131, . vol. 42; and Hintze to Lersner, July 21, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 43. The Soviets were not intimidated by the strong language of the German diplomats in Moscow, because they had intercepted an uncoded telegram from the Prussian Ministry of War to the military attaché saying that relations would not be broken.
24. Riezler to Foreign Office, July 10, 1918; Bussche to Lersner, July 11, 1918; Lersner to Foreign Office, July 14, 1918; Bussche to Lersner and Riezler, July 15, 1918; Riezler to Bussche, July 15, 1918, AA Rld 31k and Dld 131, vols. 43 ff. Riezler’s most important report is his lengthy letter to the Foreign Office of July 19, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 44: “Should we resolve to run the risk of taking the leadership of the counter-revolution into our hands, it may be possible to overthrow the entire counterrevolutionary scheme of the Entente by establishing a pro-German government in Moscow and Petersburg, which favors peace and order and comes to an agreement with the Siberian government over the heads of the Czechs.” See also the Riezler diary, Aug. 28, 1918. For the pressure of the military attachés see Lersner to Foreign Office, July 13, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 43, on which Ludendorff endorsed cooperation with the monarchists, “the only possible party for us.” See also the memorandum of the embassy’s economic specialist, Dr. List, July 11, 1918, arguing “in favor of rejecting Bolshevik ideas in order to open the field for the capitalists.” For the eventual compromise see Foreign Office to Lersner, July 20, and Hintze to Lersner, July 25, 1918, AA Rld 31k, and Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 1.
25. Hertling to Foreign Office, July 14, 1918, authorizing Helfferich’s appointment, AA Rld 31k. Riezler diary, Sept. 12, 1918. For Helfferich’s views see his telegrams beginning with July 30, the exchange with Hintze on August 1 and 2, especially the cable of August 2, transmitting Chicherin’s request for armed assistance against the Entente landing in Murmansk: “This shows glaringly in what an extreme predicament the Bolsheviks find themselves.” See also Karl Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg (Karlsruhe 1925), pp. 639 ff.; Bothmer, Mit Mirbach, pp. 111 ff.; Paquet, lm Rommunistischen Russland, pp. 79 ff.; Lockhart, British Agent, pp. 306 ff.; Verstraete, Cahiers russes, pp. 339 ff.; Kurt von Raumer, “Zwischen Brest-Litowsk und Compiègne: Die deutsche Ostpolitik vom Sommer 1918,” Baltische Lande, 4 (1939): 1-13; Williamson, J. G., Karl Helfferich, 1872-1924 (Princeton, 1971), pp. 272 ff.Google Scholar
26. Schurer, H, “Karl Moor: German Agent and Friend of Lenin,” Journal of Contemporary History, 5 (1970): 131–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
27. Riezler diary, Sept. 12, 1918. Schubert to War Ministry, Aug. 1, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 44a: “The new ambassador has gained the conviction that the embassy in Moscow cannot do any more practical work and that a visible distancing from the Bolsheviks has become indispensable and unpostponable.” See also William II’s marginalia on Hintze’s telegram to Grünau, Aug. 4, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 44a: “Helfferich’s report agrees with my opinion. It is dangerous to tie our fate further to the dying Bolsheviks!” For Helfferich’s arguments see also von Müller, G. A., Regierte der Kaiser? (Göttingen, 1959), pp. 409-10Google Scholar. Hintze’s counterarguments are summarized in his telegram to Helfferich of Aug. 4, and to Hertling, Aug. 5, 1918, AA Dld 131, vols. 44 ff., Rld 31k and Rld 61, vol. 160.
28. Riezler diary, Sept. 12, 1918. Hintze to Helfferich, Aug. 5, 1918; Hintze to Riezler, Aug. 6, 1918; Riezler to Foreign Office, Aug. 9, 1918, AA Dld 131, vols. 45-46; Riezler to Foreign Office, Aug. 18, 1918, AA Rld 61, vol. 160. See also Hintze to Ludendorff, Aug. 9, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 45: “Even a genius, taken from his surroundings and placed in Moscow, would be unable to master the completely strange conditions in the necessary seclusion of his house not to such a degree as to be able to overthrow the basic pillars of the policy of a great empire with his reports.” But on the “black day of the German army” the most telling argument was, “We lack the bayonets in order to restore the monarchy.” See Raumer, Kurt von, “Das Ende von Helfferichs Moskauer Mission 1918,” Gesamtdeutsche Vergangenheit: Festgabe für Heinrich Ritter von Srbik (Munich, 1938), pp. 392–99.Google Scholar
29. Hintze to Lersner, Aug. 6, 1918; Helfferich memorandum to Hertling, Aug. 19, AA Dld 131, vol. 46 (Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 392 ff.). More revealing yet are Hintze’s draft answer (n.d., but in the last days of August) and a Foreign Office countermemorandum, refuting Helfferich’s arguments against the supplementary treaties of Aug. 30, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 47: “[Since] after the Brest peace treaty we entered upon the path of peaceful severance of the Baltic provinces from Russia, it would now be mistaken to refuse an opportunity for the peaceful implementation of our previous policy.” See also the final reports by Colonel Schubert of August 24 and of the journalist Paquet of August 16, arguing for the revision of German Eastern policy, AA Dld 131, vol. 46. See in addition Schubert, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, pp. 21-22; Stadtler, Als politischer Soldat, p. 128; Helfferich, Weltkrieg, pp. 665 ff.; Hertling, Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei, pp. 147-48; and Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, pp. 532-33.
30. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, 1: 467; “Geheimzusätze zum Brest-Litowsker Vertrag,” Europäische Gespräche, 4 (1926): 148-53; and Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen, 1: 724 ff. See also Prittwitz, Friedrich von, Zwischen Petersburg und Washington (Munich, 1952), pp. 92 ff.Google Scholar; Kessler, Graf Harry, Walther Rathenau: Sein Leben und sein Werk (Berlin, 1929), p. 299 Google Scholar; Blücher, Deutschlands Weg, pp. 19-20; Nadolny, Rudolf, Mein Beitrag (Wiesbaden, 1955), pp. 58–59 Google Scholar; and Krassin, Lubov, Leonid Krassin: His Life and Work (London, 1929), pp. 83–84 Google Scholar. See also Norden, Albert, Zwischen Berlin und Moskau: Zur Geschichte der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen (Berlin, 1954)Google Scholar; Briunin, “Sovetsko-germanskie otnosheniia,” pp. 199-242; Gatzke, Hans, “Zu den deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im Sommer 1918,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1955): 67–98 Google Scholar; and most recently Baumgart, Winfried, “Die geschāaftliche Behandlung des Berliner Ergānzungsvertrages vom 27. August, 1918,” Historisches Jahrbuch, 89 (1969): 116-52.Google Scholar
31. Erzberger to Hintze, Aug. 21, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 46: “The signing of the new Russo-German treaty as supplement to the peace of Brest-Litovsk would be an extremely grave political mistake, since the treaty not only brings no advantages, but will contribute to the quick re-establishment of an Eastern front and the creation of a Russia forever united against Germany.” Protocol of the Reichstag leaders’ conference with the vice-chancellor, Aug. 21, 1918, AA Dld 131, vol. 47 (Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik pp. 400 ff.). Protocols of the session of the intraparty committee, Sept. 12, 1918, reprinted in Matthias, Erich and Morsey, Rudolf, Der Interfraktionelle Ausschuss, 1917/18, 2 vols. (Düsseldorf, 1959), 2: 494 ffGoogle Scholar. See also Miller, Susanne, ed., Das Kriegstagebuch des Reichstagsabgeordneten Eduard David 1914 bis 1918 (Düsseldorf, 1966), pp. 281-82Google Scholar; Epstein, Klaus, Matthias Erzberger und das Dilemma der deutschen Demokratie (Berlin, 1962), pp. 248–49 Google Scholar; and Count Westarp, K. F. V., Konservative Politik im letzten Jahrzehnt des Kaiserreiches, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1935), 2: 583-84Google Scholar
32. Riezler diary, Obersdorf, Sept. 12 and 13, 1918: “What opportunity and what charlatanism. This wants to be a world-people [Weltvolk] and defeat England. What mockery!” Favoring support of the vital Russian anti-Bolshevik movements, Riezler opposed the dismemberment of Russia through sham self-determination while endorsing independence movements wherever they seemed genuine. See also Reshetar, John S., The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920 (Princeton, 1952)Google Scholar, and Baumgart, Winfried, “Das ‘Kaspi-Unternehmen’—Grössenwahn Ludendorffs oder Routineplanung des deutschen Generalstabs?” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 18 (1970): 47–126, 231-78Google Scholar. (Baumgart’s article is typical in its frank condemnation of the military for running amuck and its reluctance to explode the illusions of the diplomats’ power policy.)
33. Riezler diary, Sept 12, 13, 24, and 30, 1918. For a critical conceptual framework regarding the interaction of domestic and foreign components in the disintegration of Wilhelmian Germany see Andreas Hillgruber, “Zwischen Hegemonie und Weltpolitik: Das Problem der Kontinuität von Bismarck bis Bettmann Hollweg,” in Stürmer, M., ed., Das kaiserliche Deutschland: Politik und Gesellschaft, 1870-1918 (Düsseldorf, 1970)Google Scholar; Berghahn, Volker R., “Das Kaiserreich in der Sackgasse,” Neue politische Literatur, 16 (1971): 434–506 Google Scholar; and my forthcoming book, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hybris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, 1972).
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