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SELF-OWNERSHIP AS PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2020

John Thrasher
John Thrasher*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Chapman University
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Abstract:

Self-ownership has fallen out of favor as a core moral and political concept. I argue that this is because the most popular conception of self-ownership, what I call the property conception, is typically linked to a libertarian (of the left or right) political program. Seeing self-ownership and libertarianism as being necessarily linked leads those who are not inclined toward libertarianism to reject the idea of self-ownership altogether. This, I argue, is a mistake. Self-ownership is a crucial moral and political concept that can earn its keep if we understand it not as type of property right in the self, but rather as a set of territorial rights one has over one’s body. This territorial conception of self-ownership, which I call the sovereignty conception of self-ownership, avoids the traditional arguments raised against the property conception of self-ownership and has other benefits besides. Accepting this conception of self-ownership, I argue, has considerable moral and political benefits without taking on the costs associated with other forms of self-ownership.

Keywords

sovereigntyrightslibertarianismpropertyownershipautonomy

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Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , Winter 2019 , pp. 116 - 133
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2020 

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