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  • Cited by 4
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Liao, Shen-yi 2016. Imaginative Resistance, Narrative Engagement, Genre. Res Philosophica, Vol. 2, Issue. 93, p. 1.

    Stock, Kathleen 2013. Imagining and Fiction: Some Issues. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 8, Issue. 10, p. 887.

    LEVIN, JANET 2011. Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 41, Issue. 3, p. 391.

    Liao, Shen-yi and Szabó Gendler, Tamar 2011. Pretense and imagination. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, Issue. 1, p. 79.



  • Julia Driver (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 20 December 2007

Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance offers some evidence that we regard our moral commitments as necessary, but in a way compatible with viewing them as dependent on desires (in some way). A limited strategy for defending sentimentalism against a common criticism is also offered.

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Social Philosophy and Policy
  • ISSN: 0265-0525
  • EISSN: 1471-6437
  • URL: /core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy
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