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  • Cited by 6
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Klocksiem, Justin 2016. How to accept the transitivity of better than. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, Issue. 5, p. 1309.


    Oliveira, Luis R. G. 2016. Rossian totalism about intrinsic value. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, Issue. 8, p. 2069.


    Arrighi, Yves Abu-Zaineh, Mohammad and Ventelou, Bruno 2015. To Count or Not to Count Deaths: Reranking Effects in Health Distribution Evaluation. Health Economics, Vol. 24, Issue. 2, p. 193.


    Arrhenius, Gustaf 2014. Enhancing Human Capacities.


    Rendall, Matthew 2013. Priority and Desert. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 16, Issue. 5, p. 939.


    PETERSEN, THOMAS SØBIRK 2008. On the Repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. Theoria, Vol. 72, Issue. 2, p. 126.


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Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism and Population Ethics

  • Gustaf Arrhenius (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800003964
  • Published online: 01 January 2009
Abstract

Fred Feldman has proposed a desert-adjusted version of utilitarianism, ‘justicism’, as a plausible population axiology. Among other things, he claims that justicism avoids Derek Parfit's ‘repugnant conclusion’. This paper explains the theory and tries to straighten out some of its ambiguities. Moreover, it is shown that it is not clear whether justicism avoids the repugnant conclusion and that it is has other counter-intuitive implications. It is concluded that justicism is not convincing as a population axiology.

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Utilitas
  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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