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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Love, Kevin 2012. Ethics in Social Research.


    Skorupski, John 2006. Propositions about Reasons. European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 14, Issue. 1, p. 26.


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Sidgwick's Minimal Metaethics

  • Robert Shaver (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0953820800002880
  • Published online: 01 January 2009
Abstract

Non-naturalism has a shady reputation. This reputation is undeserved, at least in the case of one variety of non-naturalism – the variety Sidgwick offers. In section I, I present Sidgwick's view, distinguishing it from views with which it is often lumped. In II and III, I defend Sidgwick against recent objections to non-naturalism from motivation and supervenience. In IV, I briefly consider objections which brought about the downfall of non-naturalism at the middle of the century. In V, I consider the role Sidgwick's arguments for non-naturalism play in Methods I.3. In VI, I contrast Sidgwick's attitude toward analytic metaethics to that of Moore and the non-cognitivists.

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Ewing, ‘A Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good’, Mind, xlviii (1939)

C. L. Stevenson , ‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms’, Mind, xlvi (1937), 14

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Utilitas
  • ISSN: 0953-8208
  • EISSN: 1741-6183
  • URL: /core/journals/utilitas
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