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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Goldfinch, Shaun 2016. The Advantages of Ambiguity? Development, Rule Formation and Property Rights During Transition in China. Asian Studies Review, Vol. 40, Issue. 3, p. 394.

    Graham, Benjamin A. T. Johnston, Noel P. and Kingsley, Allison F. 2016. Strategy Beyond Markets.

    Kluge, Janis Nikolaus 2016. Foreign direct investment, political risk and the limited access order. New Political Economy, p. 1.

    Posner, Eric A. 2016. Should Human Rights Law Play a Role in Development?. The World Bank Economic Review, p. lhw008.

    Post, Alison E. and Murillo, María Victoria 2016. How Investor Portfolios Shape Regulatory Outcomes: Privatized Infrastructure After Crises. World Development, Vol. 77, p. 328.

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    Frye, Timothy 2015. Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences.

    Markus, Stanislav 2015. Sovereign Commitment and Property Rights: the Case of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Studies in Comparative International Development,

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    Sng, Tuan-Hwee 2014. Size and dynastic decline: The principal-agent problem in late imperial China, 1700–1850. Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 54, p. 107.

    Weymouth, Stephen and Broz, J. Lawrence 2013. Government Partisanship and Property Rights: Cross-Country Firm-Level Evidence. Economics & Politics, Vol. 25, Issue. 2, p. 229.

    Gans-Morse, Jordan 2012. Threats to Property Rights in Russia: From Private Coercion to State Aggression. Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 28, Issue. 3, p. 263.


Secure Property as a Bottom-Up Process: Firms, Stakeholders, and Predators in Weak States

  • Stanislav Markus (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 March 2012

How do property rights become secure? How does rule of law take hold in an economy? The author uses an original survey of 516 firms in Russia and Ukraine, as well as interview-based case studies, to reexamine these fundamental issues of political economy. Most states in the developing world lack the requisite time horizons and institutional capacity to make the credible commitments emphasized in the literature. In this context, the author argues that firms can enforce their property rights without resort to mafias by forming alliances with stakeholders such as foreign actors, community residents, and labor. These stakeholders can impose costs on the potential aggressors through diverse political strategies, allowing firms to defend their property rights not only from private predators but also from the state. The article evaluates this “bottomup” theory of secure property rights against existing state-based theorizing.

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World Politics
  • ISSN: 0043-8871
  • EISSN: 1086-3338
  • URL: /core/journals/world-politics
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