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How the world trade community operates: norms and discourse


Based on the new conceptualization of the world trading system as the world trade ‘community’, this Article illuminates its internal operation based on legal discourse. The Article first defines WTO norms as lingua franca of the world trade community that enables various forms of discourse among members of the community. It then introduces three main institutionalized forms of the WTO discourse, namely adjudication, peer review, and consultation/negotiation. These three forms of WTO discourse are mainly responsible for the diurnal operation of the world trade community. The Article also explores the intermodal dynamics among these three forms of WTO discourse and demonstrates that such dynamics might generate both positive and negative consequences.

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1 Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 51.

2 See, generally, Cho, Sungjoon and Kelly, Claire R., ‘Are World Trading Rules Passé?’, 53 Va. J. Int'l L. 623 (2013).

3 See, notably, Kono, Daniel Y., ‘Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency’, 100 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 369 (2006).

4 WTO, Trade Topics, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,

5 See Lang, Andrew and Scott, Joanne, ‘The Hidden World of WTO Governance’, 20 Eur. J. Int'l L. 575, 596 (2009) (observing that the SPS Agreement monitoring process ‘serves as a catalyst for dialogue’, which allows for the exchange of information and situates the committee as ‘an interlocutor in the process of international harmonization’).

6 See, e.g., Bhagwati, Jagdish, ‘The Selfish Hegemon Must Offer a New Deal on Trade’, Financial Times, 20 August 2008, at 11.

7 See Sen, Amartya, ‘Global Doubts’, Harvard Magazine 68 (September–October 2000).

8 International Labour Organisation, ‘Constitution of the International Labour Organisation and Selected Texts’, Annex, Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organisation, para. 1(c), 2010,

9 For purposes of this article, norms are defined as ‘collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity’. Jepperson, Ronald L. et al. , ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, in Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 54; see also, Durkheim, Émile, Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, 8th edn (Paris: F. Alcan, 1927), 127 (‘Society is not a simple sum of individuals, but the system formed by their association which represents a specific reality with its own characteristics’), quoted and translated in Moeller, Hans-Geog, Luhmann Explained: From Souls to Systems (Chicago: Open Court, 2006), 229; Taylor, Charles, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, 25 Rev. Metaphy (1971).

10 See Kirgis, Frederic L., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting, 2nd edn (West Publishing Co, 1993), viii.

11 See Habermas, Jürgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. Rehg, William (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 18.

12 Cf. Bhargava, Rajeev, Individualism in Social Science (New York: Oxford, 1992), 147.

13 See Habermas, supra n. 11, at 21. Scholars discuss ‘legal discourse’ beyond the realm of IR theories (such as constructivism), such as in legal philosophy. See, notably, Goodrich, Peter, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987), 2 (regarding law as a ‘system of communication’). This article draws on, and benefits from, rich discussions from a broad range of literatures whenever relevant.

14 For this part, see Schutz, Alfred and Luckmann, Thomas, The Structures of the Life-World (vol. 2) trans. Zaner, Richard M. and Parent, David J. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989), 144–6.

15 European Communities − Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, Appellate Body and the Panel Report, as modified, adopted on 13 February 1998, para. 208, available at

16 Cf. Schutz and Luckmann, supra n. 14, at 233–35.

17 Cf. Meyer, John W., Boli, John, and Thomas, George, ‘Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account’, in Thomas, George M. (ed.), Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1987), 1237; Shiff Berman, Paul, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155, 1173, n. 81 (2007); Schiff Berman, Paul, ‘Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law’, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1265 (2006).

18 Cover, Robert M., ‘Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4 (1983).

19 Cf. Durkheim, Emile, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Ward Swain, Joseph (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 434–7.

20 Ibid. at 434–5.

21 Cf. Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 163.

22 Cf. Pouliot, Vincent, ‘“Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology’, 51 Int'l Stud. Q. 359, 362–3 (2007).

23 Adler, Emanuel, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2005).

24 Cf. Rathbun, Brian C., ‘Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory’, 51 Int'l Stud. Q 533, 551 (2007).

25 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, G. E. M., 3rd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), §243.

26 Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (3 March 2005).

27 ‘Congress Votes to Preserve US Subsidies for Brazilian Cotton Farmers’, 15 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, no. 6, 2011.

28 ‘ACP Countries Call For “Immediate Action” on Cotton Subsidies’, 15 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, no. 3, 2011.

29 Regarding the discussion of rhetorical practices, see Kratochwil, Friedrich V., Rules, Norms, and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 209; Brunnée, Jutta and Toope, Stephen J., ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law’, 39 Col. J. Transnat'l L. 19, 40n. 82 (2000). Participants in the rhetorical practice ‘first assent to the language and values of the text itself, and use the language and values to inform their relations with one another’. Kastely, A. H., ‘Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations Sales Convention’, 8 Nw. J. Int'l L. and Bus. 574 (1988); see also, Zeller, Bruno, ‘The Language of International Trade Law: Problems or Salvation?’, 10 Int'l Trade and Bus. Rev. 179, 183 (discussing a ‘rhetorical community’ involving the United Nations Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG)).

30 Vining, Joseph, ‘Fuller and Language’, in Witteveen, Willem J. and van der Burg, Wibren (eds.), Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 453, 457.

31 Wendt, supra n. 21, at 327. From a broad sociological standpoint, this intersubjective communicative process may also connote a ‘framing’ process in that each interlocutor tends to present relevant facts and arguments in a particular fashion and that a subsequent framing (reframing) is conditioned by the initial framing. See, generally, Goffman, Erving, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

32 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method, trans. Weinsheimer, Joel and Marshall, Donald G., 2nd rev. edn (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 306.

33 Regarding this ‘relatedness’, see Kratochwil, supra n. 29 at123.

34 Wendt, supra n. 21, at 347; Kramer, Roderick et al. , ‘Collective Trust and Collective Action’, in Kramer, R. and Tyler, T. (eds.), Trust in Organizationseds (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 357.

35 Snow, David A. et al. , ‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, 51 Am. Soc. Rev. 464 (1986).

36 Cf. Powell, Walter W., ‘The New Institutionalism’, in Clegg, Stewart and Russell Bailey, James (eds.), The International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008), 976; Jepperson, Ronald L., ‘Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalization’, in Powell, Walter W. and DiMaggio, Paul J. (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 144–45.

37 Cf. Zucker, Lynne G., ‘The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence’, 42 Am. Soc. Rev. 726, 728 (1977).

38 Goodrich, supra n. 13, at 3.

39 WTO Agreement, art. XVI, ¶1.

40 Japan − Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report adopted on November 1 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R.

41 See, e.g., Mexico − Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Appellate Body Report adopted on 21 November 2001, WT/DS132/AB/RW:

107. In our view, the duty of panels under Article 12.7 of the DSU to provide a ‘basic rationale’ reflects and conforms with the principles of fundamental fairness and due process that underlie and inform the provisions of the DSU … Article 12.7 also furthers the objectives, expressed in Article 3.2 of the DSU, of promoting security and predictability in the multilateral trading system and of clarifying the existing provisions of the covered agreements, because the requirement to provide ‘basic’ reasons contributes to other WTO Members' understanding of the nature and scope of the rights and obligations in the covered agreements. (emphasis added).

42 Cf. Farber, Daniel A., ‘The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of History’, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1335, 1336 (2007) (discussing ‘background legal principles'); Mitchell, Andrew D., Legal Principles in WTO Disputes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Panizzon, Marion, ‘Good Faith, Fairness, and Due Process in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice’, in Chaisse, Julian and Balmell, Tiziano (eds.), Essays on the Future of the World Trade Organization (vol. 2, The WTO Judicial System – Contributions and Challenges) (Genève: Edis, 2008).

43 Lowe, Vaughan, ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?’, in Byers, M. (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 207, 212–21.

44 United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, 30 April 2008, para. 161.

45 Cf. Ventresca, Marc J. and Mohr, John W., ‘Archival Research Methods’, in Baum, Joel A.C. (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Organizations (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 805–28.

46 See, generally, Cho, Sungjoon, Free Markets and Social Regulation: A Reform Agenda of the Global Trading System (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2003).

47 Cf. Park, Susan, ‘Norm Diffusion within International Organizations: A Case Study of the World Bank’, 8 J. Int'l R. and Dev. 111, 113 (2005).

48 See Hirsch, Moshe, ‘The Sociology of International Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation of Regional Agreements in the World Trading System’, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 277, 281 (2008) (observing that ‘international trade spreads knowledge, norms and values, through traders who often across boundaries and settle in new communities’).

49 Cf. Park, supra n. 47 (emphasizing NGO's active participation in the legal discourse within international organizations via ‘transnational advocacy networks’).

50 See Progressive Policy Institute, The WTO Has Handled 391 Disputes Since 1995, 22 April 2009.

51 I owe this insight to an anonymous referee.

52 United States − Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Panel Report adopted on 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136.

53 Brunnée and Toope, supra n. 29, at 48.

54 Jackson, John, The Jurisprudence of Gatt and the WTO: Insight on Treaty Law and Economic Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 163.

55 Fiss, Owen M., ‘The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication’, 6 L. and Human Behaviour 121, 122–24 (1982).

56 See, generally, Cho, Sungjoon, ‘Global Constitutional Lawmaking’, 31 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 621 (2010).

57 See Hongju Koh, Harold, ‘Transnational Public Law Litigation’, 100 Yale L. J. 2347, 2348–49, 2368 (1991).

58 See Peters, Anne, ‘International Dispute Settlement: A Network of Cooperational Duties’, 14 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1, 2, 9, 1516 (2003)

59 See Lamy, Pascal, ‘The Place of the WTO and Its Law in the International Legal Order’, 17 Eur. J. Int'l L. 969 (2006).

60 Busch, Marc L. and Reinhardt, Eric, ‘Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement’, 58 World Politics 446, 451 (2006) (observing that the WTO panels seldom reject third parties' requests to join the consultations).

61 Chad P. Bown, ‘MFN and the Third Party Economic Interests of Developing Countries in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Chantal Thomas and Trachtman, Joel P. (eds.), Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 265.

62 United States – Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Amendments Thereto, Request to Join Consultation (Communication from Canada), WT/DS200/8 (27 June 2000). Admittedly, commercial interests remain critical reasons behind third party interventions. See Bagwell, Kyle and Staiger, Robert W., ‘Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism, and the Rules of GATT/WTO’, J. Int'l Econ. no. 1, 2004, at 63 (implying that third parties aim to preserve their ‘own share of the dispute market’ through interventions); Chad Bown, ‘Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties and Free Riders’, World Bank Econ. Rev. no. 2, 2005, at 19 (observing that those countries having a considerable ‘market share’ in the disputed market tend to become third parties).

63 Cf. Bartels, Lorand, Procedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in the WTO Dispute Settlement System (University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.27-2012, 2012), available at (raising various situations in which third parties may share elements of a primary actor's responsibility).

64 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, arts. 10-2, 10-3

65 McCall Smith, James, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in Appellate Body Rulings’, 2 World Trade Rev., 75, 85 (2003); see also Carmody, Chi, ‘Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties under GATT’, Mich. J. Int'l L. 18 (1997).

66 Abram Chayes famously attributed this ‘demise of the bipolar structure’ to one of the characteristics of public law litigation as opposed to private law litigation. Chayes, Abram, ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1289 (1976); see also, Monaghan, Henry P., ‘Constitutional Litigation: The Who and When’, 82 Yale L. J. 1363, 1371 (1973) (observing that constitutional litigation as ‘public actions’ might not involve private rights).

67 According to Amelia Porges, about a half of formal complaints launched in the WTO dispute settlement system reached a panel stage from 1996−2000, and only 35% of these complaints resulted in a panel ruling. In the domestic setting, only 10% of all suits reach a trial. Amelia Porges, ‘Settling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?’, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 142 (2003).

68 Ibid. at 154.

69 Cf. Chayes, Abram and Handler Chayes, Antonia, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 27.

70 WTO, Trade Policy Reviews: Ensuring Transparency,

71 See Scott, Joanne, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.

72 Ibid. at 57.

73 Wolfe, Robert, ‘See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System’, 11 Eur. J. Int'l Relations 339 (2005).

74 Gerard Ruggie, John, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together?: Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’, 52 Int'l Org. 855, 860 (1998); See, generally, Weber, Max, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, eds. and trans. Shils, Edward A. and Finch, Henry A. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949).

75 WTO, SPS Information Management System,

76 Chimni, B. S., ‘Co-Option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law’, 37 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. and Pol. 799, 806, 813–14 (2005).

77 Gibson, James L., ‘A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate’, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 819 (1998).

78 See Mavroidis, Petros C., ‘No Outsourcing of Law?: WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts’, 102 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 9 (2008).

79 Krisch, Nico, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’, 17 Eur. J. Int'l L. 247, 276–77 (2006). But see Shaffer, Gregory, ‘A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Institutional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case’, 41 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. and Pol. 1, 6465 (2008) (warning that pluralist approaches may allow powerful actors to ‘manipulate processes to give the appearance of consideration of affected foreigners without in any way modifying a predetermined outcome’).

80 Risse, Thomas, ‘Let's Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics’, 54 Int'l Org. 1, 8 (2000) (citing Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in Jon, Elster and Aanund, Hylland (eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 118).

81 Guzman, Andrew T. and Simmons, Beth A., ‘To Settle or Empanel?: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization’, 31 J. Legal Stud. S205, S206 (2002) (arguing that WTO members are more likely to settle on such subjects as make transfer payments between parties easier than those ones that leave little room to compromise).

82 Robert Echandi, ‘How to Successfully Manage Conflicts and Prevent Dispute Adjudication in International Trade’, 26 (ICTSD Issue Paper No. 11, 2013).

83 See, e.g., GATT art.XXII

84 See, e.g., WTO DSU, arts. 4.2, 4.6

85 WTO, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 6, The Process − Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, available at

86 See Davey, William J. and Porges, Amelia, ‘Performance of the System I: Consultations and Deterrence’, 32 Int'l Law 695, 705 (1998).

87 Jon Elster, ‘Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies’ (presentation, The Storrs Lectures, New Haven, CT, 1991), quoted in Habermas, supra n. 11.

88 Braithwaite, John and Drahos, Peter, Global Business Regulation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 196.

89 Shaffer, Gregory, ‘Power, Governance, and the WTO: A Comparative Institutional Approach’, in Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (eds.), Power in Global Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 130–34.

90 Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, ‘Changes in Trade Challenge How We Manage Trade Policies’, WTO News (16 March 2012), available at

91 Finger, J. Michael et al. , Market Access Bargaining in the Uruguay Round: Rigid or Relaxed Reciprocity? 24 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2258, 1999).

92 See Kono, ‘Optimal Obfuscation’, supra n. 3, at 371 (viewing that democracy reduces incentives to employ tariffs while increasing incentives to employ less transparent NTBs).

93 See, generally, World Trade Organization, 15 Years of the Information Technology Agreement: Trade, Innovation and Global Production Networks (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2012).

94 Ibid. at 27.

95 See Cho, Sungjoon and Kelly, Claire R., ‘Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G20’, 12 Chi. J. Int'l L. 491 (2012).

96 Cf. Habermas, supra n. 11, at 166.

97 See Steinberg, Richard H., ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power?: Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO’, 56 Int'l Org. 339 (2002). Cf. Mnookin, Robert H. and Kornhauser, Lewis, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of Law: The Case of Divorce’, 88 Yale L. J. 950 (1979).

98 DSU art. 3.7; Ceva, Emanuela and Fracasso, Andrea, ‘Seeking Mutual Understanding: A Discourse-Theoretical Analysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement System’, 9 World Trade Rev. 457, 476 (2010).

99 Cf. Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond, in Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (eds.), Power in Global Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1317.

100 See Cho and Kelly, supra n. 95, at 509.

101 Cf. Taylor, supra n. 9, at 60.

102 See, generally, Cho, Sungjoon, ‘Of the World Trade Court's Burden’, 20 Eur. J. Int'l L. 675 (2009).

103 Schmidt, Vivien A., The Futures of European Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

104 See , Sungjoon Cho, ‘United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC–Hormones’, 103 Am. J. Int'l L. 299 (2009).

105 ‘Canadian Ban on Brazilian Beef Imports Escalates Trade Battle’, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest. (Int'l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switzerland), 13 February 2001.

106 WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Implementation Proposal under Paragraph 21: Proposal by Brazil, G/SPS/W/108 (22 June 2001).

107 WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7): Revision, G/SPS/7/Rev.2 (2 April 2002).

108 See, generally, Sungjoon Cho, ‘From Control to Communication’, 44 Cornell J. Int'l L. 249.

109 WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/36, 11 July 2005.

110 See, generally, World Health Organization, Food Safety: Risk Communication, available at

111 Panel Report, European Communities and its Member States − Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, WT/DS375/R, Aug. 16, 2010.

112 See, e.g., WTO, Information Technology: Progress Reported on Expanding Product Coverage, 1 November 2012.

113 See Smith, Fiona, ‘Law, Language and International Trade Regulation in the WTO’, 63 Current Legal Problems 2010, 458 (Letsas, George and O'Cinneide, Colm eds., 2010).

114 United States − Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, supra n. 52.

115 United States − Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Panel Report adopted on 7 November 1989, B.I.S.D.36S/386, para. 5.11 (1989) [hereinafter Section 337].

116 Guzman and Simmons, supra n. 81, at S205.

117 ‘Governments Exploring How to Restart Doha Round Talks’, 10 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, no. 28, 2006.

118 Busch and Reinhardt, supra n. 60, at 446.

119 William J. Davey, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism’, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, no. 03-08 (University of Illinois, 2003), 15.

120 Busch and Reinhardt, supra n. 60, at 457.

121 Ibid. at 448.

122 See Cho, Sungjoon, ‘Doha's Development’, 25 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 165 (2007).

123 Jonathan, Wheatley, ‘Brazil to Dispute US Subsidies’, Financial Times, 3 August 2008.

124 Ibid.

125 See Davey, William J., ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: Segregating the Useful Political Aspects and Avoiding “Over-Legalization”’, in New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honor of John H. Jackson 295–56 (Bronckers, Marco and Quick, Reinhard eds., 2000) (prioritizing ‘consultation’ over adjudication in resolving politically sensitive disputes).

126 See Baldwin, Richard, ‘WTO agreement: The Bali Ribbon’, Vox (12 December 2013).

127 The WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo also attributed the Bali success to a ‘collective awareness’ among WTO members that: ‘(1) the agreement being pursued was desirable for everyone and, above all, doable for everyone; (2) a positive outcome would not produce winners and losers, nor a North-South divide (both developed and developing countries would need to work for the agreement); (3) the multilateral trading system needs to be reinvigorated to benefit everyone, particularly the smallest countries and those with least capacity to manage the intricacies of large-scale trade negotiations'. WTO, WTO News, ‘“Bali Is Just the Start” –Azevêdo’ (6 January 2014), However, as of 31 July 2014, the Protocol of Amendment for the WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement remains unadopted. See ‘WTO Trade Facilitation Deal in Limbo as Deadline Passes Without Resolution’, 18 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, no. 28 (31 July 2014), available at

128 See Uri Dadush, ‘How Can the World Trade Organization Stay Relevant?’, World Econ. Forum (14 January 2014), available at

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