The term ‘New International Economic Order’ – often referred to as N.I.E.O. – suggests two immediate thoughts: the first is related to ‘New’ and the second emphasises ‘Order’.

The New Versus The Old International Economic Order

If there is to be a new order, then presumably it must be contrasted with an old order, an O.I.E.O., namely the Bretton Woods system which was established at the end of World War II as a result of Anglo-American negotiations, with an absorbing interplay between the intellect of Keynes, subtly representing British interests, coming up against the hard facts of U.S. power and economic supremacy.

This article discusses some of the issues involved in the choice of technology in developing countries, especially those in Africa, and the relationship of this to employment and output. The problem is to find an optimum combination of productive resources that comes nearest to satisfying two objectives: the full and economically efficient utilisation of such resources, and the creation of as much surplus as possible over current consumption, thereby making possible new investment and long-term growth.

Observers have been intrigued by the relationship which has developed between the United Nations and Africa, a continent that now houses one-third of the membership of the world institution. Investigators have been seduced by subjects such as African frustration with the world organisation,1 African cohesion on Assembly roll-calls,2 African co-operation with Latin America in New York,3 or the impact of Mother Africa's offspring upon the United Nations.4 A few authors have sensed the magnitude of the impact which the world organisation has had upon the continent5, and several have detailed discrete instances of what has happened. What we have not seen is a general assessment of this impact with supporting data. My aim is to fill this gap in the literature, and to determine to what extent the existence of the United Nations has made a difference for Africa.

International political considerations are now an integral part of the fabric of the emerging African state systems. As national governments struggle with the complex problems of institution-building and economic development, they are increasingly obliged to look beyond their existing territorial boundaries. At the same time, it is not unusual to find that the economic, political, and bureaucratic interests of various expatriate government or inter-state actors are being pursued in the context of African development initiatives.

Tanzania differs from many countries in the Third World in that it does not have a fully fledged national bourgeoisie. The class that led the nationalist movement, the petty bourgeoisie, captured the fruits of the drive towards political independence. The upper stratum transformed itself into a bureaucratic bourgeoisie and used the state apparatus against its local rivals, initially the commercial bourgeoisie. But owing to a weak material base rooted outside the local economy, the former has been unable to direct effectively the process of accumulation and economic reproduction. Thus, while the governing class of Tanzania is comprised of African politicians and civil servants, the ruling class is the international bourgeoisie.1

Conventional WisdomOne of the most widely accepted assumptions in the literature on rural development during the past two decades has been the belief that ‘favouring the progressive farmer’ is prudent policy. The safest way of investing rural development funds, it has been argued repeatedly, is to allocate them to those who have already succeeded in farming or business, or who have had relevant training or education. They are the people who are the most likely to achieve increased levels ofb production and income.

Among the rights promised to individuals and groups, the ‘right of association’ frequently appears. It is enshrined in national constitutions, in international declarations and conventions, and in standard references to the liberties and privileges that citizens enjoy. Yet, as this article will illustrate, restrictions on this right have been justified in the name of higher objectives. The right of association, it would appear, is a conditional or second-order right, subordinated on occasion to more pressing rights. The strains of recent independence, regionalism, and labour unrest have brought about limits to the creation of association, whether political or non-political in nature.

IN his thorough sociological study of Afrikaner ideology, Dunbar Moodie has shown that the civil theology most adequate to the exigencies of the 1930s was an interpretation ‘which was tight enough to unite Afrikaners and yet loose enough to allow considerable difference of opinion on practical matters’.2 While the same functional needs for a proper ideology remain for the 1970S and 80s, ‘civil theology’ can no longer fulfil this task. This is mainly due to increased secularisation and value changes in an urbanised life, which has diluted traditional culture with the corruptive spoils of affluence. Moodie aptly concludes that the exigencies of Afrikaner power have changed the debate from one between rival metaphysical interpretations of Christian-Nationalism (Kuyperianism, neo-Fichteanism, Volkskerk) to that of ‘the very continuance of ideology itself’.3 Such considered findings are confirmed by similar observations of ‘outsiders’ who have returned after a lengthy exile. In the assessment of Ezekiel Mphahlele:

Is food aid an effective means of assisting the needy, or a cynical response to inefficient agricultural policies in the rich countries? The second view is increasingly being heard, particularly in the main donor countries;2 yet the World Food Council, on which the developing countries are strongly represented, has called for even greater efforts so that at least 10 million tons of grain are available for food aid each year. This brief article outlines the scope and major conclusions of an O.D.I. research project that has studied the impact of food aid in four African countries in order to answer the question posed in the title.3

Political scientists during the last 20 years have been bombarded by a bewildering array of approaches and methods to the study of their discipline, including structural-functionalism, systems and partial systems, decision-making, costs and benefits, patron-client relationships, micro-politics, politimetrics, mobilisation systems, survey research, aggregate data and content analysis, Q methodology, and experimentalism. With so many different approaches and techniques available to students of politics, it is not surprising that the discipline is in a twilight period characterised by confusion and disillusionment.

Nigeria's Third National Development Plan is based on the proposition that judicious use of current oil revenues to build social and economic infrastructures, and to radically transform the nature of economic activity, represents the quickest and most effective means of development.1 Top priority is to be given during the period 1975 to 1980 to manufacturing in the belief that an industrial base is the firmest foundation for self-sustained growth.

The Soviet Union is not able to replace western economic investments even in those African countries which become its affies. Therefore its influence is limited to the political sphere, mainly to inter-party relations. By playing a crucial rôle in Southern Africa and Ethiopia, the Soviet Union has accomplished an important step in its global strategy.

Dependency theory has sometimes been called a perspective, rather than a theory, due to the multiplicity of often contrasting arguments attributed to it. Nevertheless, the theses of such well-known authors as Samir Amin and Cohn Leys have gained general recognition as representative of the theory. Both attempt to explain the general causes of underdevelopment, notably those factors underlying the poor sectoral articulation, skewed demand profile, and uneven economic growth of many Third-World countries. They argue that their long-run development is stifled by certain domestic class formations and relationships with international capital, thereby producing dependent economic structures.