This special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly was organized for two reasons. First, the academic fields of business ethics and accounting ethics have developed without close theoretical or empirical connections. This is the case even though the profession of accounting is an important component of the organizational world. For this reason, it is important to foster attempts to build a bridge between the two fields, so that research in accounting ethics is more closely related to business ethics. Second, the recent deluge of business scandals (primarily, but not only, in the United States) in which financial reporting and auditing were central elements suggests that a special issue on accounting ethics is timely.

The original hope was that the special issue would contain a balance of papers from researchers in “accounting ethics” and those in “business ethics.” In line with the hope that the papers would be responsive to both fields, almost every paper submitted was reviewed by one person who is identified with business ethics and one person who is identified with accounting ethics. As it turns out, most of the papers in this issue were written by people whose academic home is the accounting department. The mix of papers reflects the emphasis in the accounting literature on empirical research on ethical behavior.

This paper analyzes the rhetoric surrounding the profession’s presentations of auditor independence. We trace the evolution of the character of the auditor from Professional Man in the early years of the twentieth century to the more public and abstract figures of Judicial Man and Economic Man. The changing character of the auditor in the profession’s narratives of legitimation reflects changes in the role of auditing, in the economic environment, and in the values of American society. Economic man is a self-interested and shallow character who offered the auditing profession little protection against involvement in corporate scandals. In the wake of recent accounting scandals, the profession is calling for a return to the character of Professional Man to restore trust in audits and the financial markets.

We also analyze the philosophical bases of the metaphors surrounding auditor independence. These metaphors, particularly the metaphor of independence as separation, create problems in conceptualizing independence concepts. How can you discuss appropriate relationships when your basic concept is one of separation, or no relationship? On the other hand, relational concepts of independence are also flawed if they are not based on a firm moral foundation. We suggest how the profession can act to rebuild its moral foundation through recognition of collective responsibility.

This paper describes the professional ethical context behind the failure of Arthur Andersen’s audit of Enron. It is argued that the evolution of extreme industrial concentration in the accounting profession, and the subsequent unrestrained diversification of the “Big Five” accounting firms were the sources of multiple conflicts of interest that were unresolved by the time of the Enron debacle. In the post-Enron era, the problems of commercial conflicts of interest and of highly concentrated power in the profession remain important issues.

Accountancy is believed by its practitioners to be a profession, not a commercial venture. (Magill, Previts, and Robinson 1998: 4)

In this paper we develop a categorization scheme for stakeholder research based on differences in studies’ primary level of analysis (managerial agency, organizational, or societal) and use this scheme to review and critique genres of stakeholder-based accounting research. We draw three primary conclusions: 1) stakeholder research in accounting should more clearly incorporate the business ethics stakeholder literature, 2) ethical issues are much less likely to be considered in stakeholder-based accounting research when a managerial agency level of analysis is adopted, and 3) the accounting discipline can learn from debates within the business ethics literature concerning shareholder dominance and stakeholder legitimacy. These conclusions, taken together, demonstrate the need for accounting researchers to become more focused on ethical considerations in the design of accounting information systems, performance measurement criteria, and financial reporting models.

There is a long-running debate among legal scholars regarding the propriety and enforceability of SEC attempts to mandate disclosures of antisocial or illegal corporate activities that do not materially impact a company’s financial statements. This debate was recently revived by the issuance of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, Materiality in Financial Statements (SEC 1999), which suggests that quantitatively immaterial information relating to unlawful transactions or regulatory non-compliance should be considered for disclosure. This issue has important implications for the accounting profession, although it has generally been ignored in the accounting literature. This paper reviews legal and ethical considerations raised by the issue of qualitative disclosures, and also presents the results of a preliminary empirical test of the impact of such disclosures on financial statement users’ judgments. The results of this study indicate that investors consider the nondisclosure of immaterial illegal acts to be unethical, and reject suggestions that such information lacks moral intensity. The results also suggest that immaterial illegal acts have a significant effect on investors’ perceptions of the quality of corporate management and the likelihood of investment in a company. This effect was more pronounced when the illegal act was combined with self-dealing on the part of corporate executives.

The current study is designed to propose and test a model about the ethical reputation of a target manager who must decide whether to engage in earnings management. We employ an experimental approach to examine the potential negative reputation effects within the internal labor market of a firm that occur as a consequence of earnings management. We examine participants’ responses to a hypothetical (target) manager when both the target’s behavior and the corporate incentives were manipulated. Participants assessed how ethical they believed a target manager to be, based on the target’s decision regarding earnings management and the nature of the corporate incentives. Participants also assessed the target’s managerial ability. Participants’ judgments regarding the target’s morality were significantly affected by the target’s behavior, but were not affected by the incentive structure. Ability judgments were significantly and positively related with morality assessments. Further analysis indicates that morality assessments mediate the relationships between the target’s behavior and the participants’ willingness to extend work-related opportunities to the target. Implications of these results for management control systems design and for future research are discussed.

In this paper, we develop a typology of auditors’ virtues through in-depth interviews with nine exemplars of the audit community. We compare this typology with prescribed auditors’ virtues as represented in the applicable Code of Professional Conduct. Our comparison shows that the Code places a primary emphasis on mandatory virtues including the virtues of “independent,” “objective,” and “principled.” While the non-mandatory virtues, which involve “going beyond the minimum” and “putting the public interest foremost,” were identified by our exemplars as essential to the auditor’s role, they received little or no emphasis in the Rules of Professional Conduct. We find this particularly alarming, given that the exemplars interviewed for this study viewed these virtues are essential to the auditors’ role. If the audit profession wishes to uphold public confidence by encouraging the possession of non-mandatory auditors’ virtues, our research suggests that non-mandatory auditors’ virtues should be explicitly described and included in rules of professional conduct.

Recent calls have been made to move professional standards to a more principles-based perspective, supposing that emphasizing broad principles would eliminate the legalistic focus that rules may encourage, and accountants’ behavior would be more ethical and uniformly so. However, this supposition has yet to be empirically tested. The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (Code) provides guidance in both forms: principles and rules. This experiment examines how the form of the Code affects independence judgments in a client acceptance context. We also examine the potential for levels of moral development to influence the effectiveness of the Code. We find that subjects are more likely to consider their independence impaired, and are more likely to reject a questionable audit engagement, when rules-based (principles-based) reasoners are provided with Code rules (principles). Given the popularity of the view that rules-based standards are undesirable, these findings have significant implications for the profession as principles-based ethical standards are discussed.

This study introduces Moscovici’s (1976, 1985) model of social influence to the accounting research domain, and uses an experiment to assess whether his theory explains how different types of discussion affects consensus in auditors’ ethical reasoning. Moscovici’s theory proposes three modalities of influence to describe how consensus is achieved following discussion: conformity, innovation, and normalization. Conformity describes the situation where individuals in the minority (e.g., auditors that do not accept the dominant view) accede to the majority (e.g., auditors that hold the dominant view) as a result of group discussion. Innovation describes the situation where individuals in the majority accede to the minority. Normalization describes the situation where there is reciprocal influence.

We find that conformity occurs when auditors are asked to prescriptively discuss what ideally “should” be the resolution to an ethical dilemma. Normalization occurs when auditors are asked to deliberatively discuss what realistically would be the resolution to an ethical dilemma. The results of this study suggest that prescriptive discussion of an ethical dilemma encourages auditor groups to strive to find the best response to a moral dilemma if it is represented by the majority view. In contrast, deliberative discussion of an ethical dilemma may encourage the elimination of multiple viewpoints. The results of this study have important implications for understanding the social influence process that affects auditors’ ethical reasoning.

This research examines in a collectivist culture the influence of cognitive moral development, attitudes toward rule-directed behavior, and the perceived importance of codes of conduct and professional standards on auditor judgments about ethical dilemmas. Taiwanese audit professionals were asked to respond to two ethical dilemmas. The first dilemma concerns a situation in which the auditor is asked to acquiesce to a controller’s request to conceal an irregularity. The probability that the auditor’s acquiescence is discovered (i.e., the threat of a sanction) was manipulated in this scenario. The second dilemma involves a case in which the auditor has information that a write-down of obsolete inventory will have a material effect on the earnings of a corporation, and must consider whether or not to inform an individual who is heavily invested in the corporation. The individual’s ingroup status (i.e., whether the individual was a relative or friend of the auditor) was manipulated in this scenario.

Auditors were more likely to agree with violations of ethical standards in the first scenario (concealing a client employee’s irregularity) than in the second (revealing confidential information to parties outside the client). In the first scenario, auditors with lower levels of cognitive moral development were less likely to agree with violations of ethical standards when the threat of a sanction was present, while the judgments of those with higher levels of cognitive moral development were not affected by the presence of sanctions. Contrary to expectations, auditors were more likely to agree with violations of ethical standards when the individual involved was a close friend, rather than a relative. In general, as the perceived importance of rules increased, the propensity to violate the Code of Conduct decreased.