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COHERENCE AND CORRESPONDENCE IN THE NETWORK DYNAMICS OF BELIEF SUITES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 May 2016

Patrick Grim ,
Andrew Modell ,
Nicholas Breslin ,
Jasmine Mcnenny ,
Irina Mondescu ,
Kyle Finnegan ,
Robert Olsen ,
Chanyu An  and
Alexander Fedder
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Abstract

Coherence and correspondence are classical contenders as theories of truth. In this paper we examine them instead as interacting factors in the dynamics of belief across epistemic networks. We construct an agent-based model of network contact in which agents are characterized not in terms of single beliefs but in terms of internal belief suites. Individuals update elements of their belief suites on input from other agents in order both to maximize internal belief coherence and to incorporate ‘trickled in’ elements of truth as correspondence. Results, though often intuitive, prove more complex than in simpler models (Hegselmann and Krause 2002, 2006; Grim et al. 2015). The optimistic finding is that pressures toward internal coherence can exploit and expand on small elements of truth as correspondence is introduced into epistemic networks. Less optimistic results show that pressures for coherence can also work directly against the incorporation of truth, particularly when coherence is established first and new data are introduced later.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 233 - 253
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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