Canada is the fourth industrial power, the fourth naval power, and the fourth air power in the free world. These facts are new, the result of the war. Taken with Canada's membership in the British Commonwealth, her close association with her friendly American neighbour, and her geographical relationship to the Soviet Union, they give her world-wide interests, major responsibilities, and definite opportunities. Canada's resources, geographical position, and dependence on world trade give her a stake in the peace of the world as great as that of any nation.

But whatever may be the position or interests of any nation today, it is clear that the making of peace, the keeping of peace, and, to a lesser degree, the formation and conduct of the numerous functional organizations necessary to conduct business between nations, depend on the attitude of the three major military powers among the United Nations.

What Canada's place will be in post-war international organization depends partly on the nature of the organization and partly on the recognition by our Canadian people of Canada's position and interests. To tell what that place is likely to be we must first try to see what the post-war organization may or should be like, and then estimate where Canada's opinion will stand.

In this paper an attempt is made to work out mathematically a pure theory of money. The method employed is to consider only those operations which are fundamental to all monetary economies. These fundamental operations are spending, saving, and investing and any relationships which can be shown to exist between them must, therefore, be valid for all economic systems employing money.

The quantities dealt with in this analysis are purely monetary ones: no considerations of value arise. The resulting equations, therefore, express relationships between different quantities of money or between different money flows.

We shall first investigate the operations of spending and investing and then consider the operation of saving.

In order to simplify the problem, we shall consider first an economic system of a restricted type and then later remove the restrictions in order to achieve generality. We postulate that this simplified system operates under the following two restrictions: (a) no investment is made except by an industrial unit; (b) there is no taxation.

At an early point in the Economics of Imperfect Competition Mrs. Robinson assures us that her attention is to be confined to equilibrium analysis only and that she proposes to make no study of the process of inter-equilibrium adjustment. “The technique set out in this book is a technique for studying equilibrium positions. No reference is made to the effects of the passage of time. Short-period and long-period equilibria are introduced into the argument to illustrate various technical devices, but no study is made of the process of moving from one position of equilibrium to another ….” There are two alternatives open to the theorist who has adopted a methodological precept involving the complete separation of equilibrium and process analysis. It is possible, on the one hand, to follow the precept with the utmost rigour, in which case the equilibrium theory will be almost purely formal and hardly constitute an explanation of the equilibrium. Or the theorist can in practice relax his rule and introduce process propositions into the equilibrium theory. Few writers have been able fully to resign themselves to the first alternative and most have in greater or less degree followed the second. Thus there has been elaborated, largely unconsciously, a theory of the process of interequilibrium adjustment which forms an integral part of the accepted theory of the equilibrium of the firm in its usual form. It is the purpose of this paper to bring this adjustment theory explicitly to view and to determine the degree to which the validity of the equilibrium propositions is dependent upon it. It is emphasized that the discussion is restricted to the questions of internal logical consistency and formal generality of the theory.

The Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act of 1931 is the statutory embodiment of the principles underlying the control which the Parliament of Canada exercises over the receipt and issue of moneys from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It is the most recent of the legislative milestones which mark the evolution of systematic control from the plodding simplicity of the methods of 1855, when the first Audit Act was passed, to the mechanized organization of the present day.

Legislative financial power had been firmly established in 1878 with the appointment of an Auditor General as an officer of Parliament, to regulate the issue of moneys from the treasury and to examine and report upon the public expenditures. With wide powers of inquiry and examination, the Auditor General possessed the means to learn if legislative directions were being obeyed. Control of the issue gave him the means to deal with the misapplication of appropriations by refusing to sanction further issue. This ever-present threat, hovering as the sword of Damocles over the heads of the spending departments, was ready at the word of the Auditor to cut off the flow of money from the treasury. For fifty-three years, legislative regulation of the issue served as a more or less effective restraint on executive disobedience to parliamentary directions.

Dominion Order-in-Council 1003 passed in February of this year promises to be epoch-making in labour relations in Canada. It commands the parties to bargain collectively, assists them to reach agreement, names and enjoins against both employer and workers certain practices opposed to wholesome bargaining relations, and sets up a special Board judicial in character to administer and enforce the Order. Following as it does in the wake of a half-dozen provincial statutes reaching toward the same general purpose, its appearance calls for a review of state policy with respect to collective bargaining in modern industrial society. What are the trends? And with what particular phases of the movement has the State concerned itself across a century and a half? What is to be the future status of collective agreements at law?

The attitude and behaviour of the State may conveniently be considered in three phases which are only roughly separable in time. In some countries all three have been experienced while in others progress has been made only to the second. There is considerable difference in opinion in fact whether the change from the second to the third represents the true path of social advance. The first phase is found in the earlier nineteenth-century outlook and practice of State opposition to collective bargaining (a condition which in some countries continued well into the twentieth). The second involves the withdrawal of opposition but where collective bargaining is regarded as outside the State's responsibility. Trade unions and employers' associations are treated as voluntary autonomous associations having important dealings with one another, but collective agreements have no status as contracts; neither in negotiating or enforcing, in assisting or in interpreting does the State lend its authoritative hand. The two collective parties are left to work it out for themselves without benefit of sovereign authority. Third we find the phase of positive State participation, operating as the case may be (1) through compulsion in labour disputes seen in its fullest in Australia; (2) through making collective agreements enforceable at law and thus making the parties responsible for performance, practised for many years in Sweden; (3) through compelling the parties (and particularly the employer) to negotiate with a view to forming agreements, the classic example being the United States since the middle 1930's; and finally (4), in addition to this last, through assuming a responsibility for assisting them to reach agreement and provide adequate machinery for interpretation and enforcement, these being the heavy tasks of government under the Canadian Order.