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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2021

Christoph Kelp  and
Mona Simion
Christoph Kelp
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
Mona Simion
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
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Sharing Knowledge
A Functionalist Account of Assertion
 , pp. 197 - 204
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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  • Bibliography
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Sharing Knowledge
  • Online publication: 18 November 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009036818.016
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  • Bibliography
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Sharing Knowledge
  • Online publication: 18 November 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009036818.016
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  • Bibliography
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book: Sharing Knowledge
  • Online publication: 18 November 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009036818.016
Available formats
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