Like countless countries grappling with the challenge of late development, South Korea has – since the 1960s – accumulated large volumes of foreign debt. And like so many others, Korea has subsequently suffered a series of debt crises, some prompting intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet unlike other countries, Korea has tended to recover swiftly from each crisis, most recently the 1997–98 regional turmoil and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, despite recurrent debt crises, Korea has managed to stay a successful course of economic development. So what might policymakers elsewhere learn from Korea’s experience of debt-based development, and from its management of recurrent debt dilemmas? In this chapter I examine the critical role played by Korean policymakers in governing the country’s debt-based development strategy from the 1960s to the 1990s, and in mitigating the worst effects of its 1997–98 and 2008 financial crises. I conclude by drawing lessons from the Korean experience for policymakers elsewhere.