The conclusion summarizes the book's argument and then develops the scholarly and policy implications of its findings. My work adds an important causal mechanism to the ethnic conflict literature, linking the creation and dismantling of ethnic patronage networks to violence. My work also suggests that civil-military relations should be central to the study of democratization and democratic consolidation. The tendency of African leaders to ensure stability in the past, by tying soldiers to the state through shared identity and ethnically-based patronage, can lead to military intervention when elections grant power to new ethnic groups. My findings also have important ramifications for peace-building efforts in the aftermath of ethnic conflict. My work emphasizes just how difficult it is to build nationally representative security institutions in ethnically tense and politicized contexts. Finally, I build a case for merit-based military institutions as both normatively desirable and necessary for long-term peace and stability and suggest ways in which the international community can assist in military reform.