This chapter explores variation in crime-fighting by the US Army, British Army, German Army, and Italian Carabinieri in Afghanistan, following the US-led invasion after 9/11. It describes the growing insurgency, how the select military forces responded under Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, and how varying counter-insurgency practices impacted civilians. The US Army caused significant numbers of civilian casualties before 2009, when it switched to population-centric counter-insurgency. This switch reduced civilian casualties yet had negative indirect effects on civilians, by contributing to a change in insurgent tactics. The British Army was more cautious in its treatment of civilians and switched to population-centric COIN earlier than the US. However, it also caused much ‘collateral damage’ and increased insurgents’ reliance on asymmetric tactics. The German Army was slow in adapting to COIN. While its reluctance to fight limited negative knock-on effects for civilians, there were also incidents where German casualty aversion caused civilian casualties. The Carabinieri focused on training Afghan gendarmeries, with training quickly becoming militarized. The Italians contributed to professionalizing their trainees yet it remains unclear whether training enhanced the security of people in Afghanistan.