It might be thought that some of the pieces in this Part are rather humdrum but in their ordinariness lies their interest. Two items chronicle the formality and protocol of meeting between American and British ships [159, 160]. Their stiffness is relieved by reports of lavish dinners, entertainments and hospitality [159, 160, 162, 165]. Despite obvious nationalistic rivalries, relations between the men were extremely cordial [167, 170]. There were amusing tales of how Prohibition was circumvented [162, 165]. By tacit consent, wrangles over limitation at Geneva and London [1930] did not carry over into meetings between the sailors afloat [162, 163, 165] and there was a notable absence of the suspicion and distrust which is the repeated theme of other Parts.

The British marvelled at American technical expertise and productive capacity, and even more at the largesse apparently available to the US Navy [154, 167, 170, 178, 179]. It was undeniable that the Americans were more advanced in a material sense, their ships equipped with facilities and comforts the cause of admiring remarks by British officers. In part the comparative lack of modern equipment in British ships was the result of financial stringency but it was also a cultural decision – what had been good enough for Nelson appeared to be good enough for a much later Georgian navy. The US Navy, though founded in the time of Nelson, was much more up to date, reflecting the expectations of American society; and, as there were problems at times with recruitment and retention of enlisted men, it was also incumbent on the Navy Department to ensure that the gap between civilian life and that on the ocean waves was closed, not only with home comforts but also with a more relaxed code of discipline [154, 167]. The enlisted men were well educated and their life afloat was relieved not only by comforts but also by laboursaving machinery [154, 167, 170].

Nowhere was the American identification with the leading edge of technology more apparent than in naval aviation. Senior American officers were concerned to retain control of their service's air power and believed it to be superior to the British system, where the RAF managed all aviation under the Trenchard doctrine of the indivisibility of air power.