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Epilogue: the power of law to reshape markets

from Part V - Conceptual Utopia: the market after the market

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2016

Bertram Lomfeld
Affiliation:
Freie Universität Berlin
Alessandro Somma
Affiliation:
University of Ferrar
Peer Zumbansen
Affiliation:
King's College London
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Reshaping Markets
Economic Governance, the Global Financial Crisis and Liberal Utopia
, pp. 347 - 356
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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