There are few worse sins for an intelligence agency than getting dragged into a political battle where it is seen to lose objectivity, integrity and, consequently, reputation. On the heels of what was seen as the CIA’s largest intelligence failure since its inception, the agency's reputation and capability were soon to be again in question. On 20 March 2003 the combined forces of the US, UK, Australia and Poland invaded Iraq. The US military contingent was the largest, comprising roughly 150,000 troops. For President George W. Bush, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ was designed to ‘disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people’. Although the war was initially supported by many Americans, it was also fiercely opposed – particularly internationally. Many felt that a diplomatic solution was a more viable option, and this view was endorsed by the governments of Germany, France and New Zealand.

The primary factor for debate concerning the cause for war centred around Iraq's supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Did it possess any? If so, what threat did they pose, and would Saddam use them? Prior to the invasion, significant efforts took place in public and behind the scenes to convince the world that Iraq had such weapons. Multinational diplomatic efforts took place through the prism of the UN and the on-site inspections undertaken by the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), led by Hans Blix.

A fortnight before the invasion took place, Blix informed the UN that no such weapons had been found so far. Proponents of an invasion argued that it would only be possible to find the weapons once Saddam's government had been toppled and proper searches conducted, without Iraqi obfuscation. Meanwhile, high-profile presentations were designed and delivered with the objective of convincing those who were unsure or wavering that Iraq did indeed possess prohibited weapons. These included what would become the most infamous public defence of the case for war: Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN in February 2003, when he held aloft illustrations of mobile biological warfare laboratories.