Introduction

UN scholars often overlook Trygve Lie’s contribution to the development of the political role of the UN secretary-general. To the extent that he is remembered for his political actions, it is in the case of ‘the Palestine problem’. Lie himself would later regard the State of Israel ‘as his child’, and he took pride in the part he played in helping to establish the Jewish state in Palestine. Lie was an enthusiastic supporter of Israel’s UN membership application in 1949 and sought to use every means at his disposal to ensure the necessary majority in the General Assembly. Ralph Bunche, the acting UN mediator, described in his diary how, ‘Lie phoned me in evening – very upset – said Israelis had to be admitted now; wanted me to make a statement in favor’. Allegedly, Lie also passed ‘secret’ information to the Zionists/Israelis on several occasions, and he attempted to leverage his contacts in Norway to ensure its delegation voted in favour of the Israeli membership application. These episodes have led contemporary observers and later researchers alike to accuse him of harbouring a pro-Zionist bias that came into conflict with what they perceive to be the proper way of fulfilling his role as UN secretary-general.

Ironically, in the one instance that historians recognize Lie’s efforts to expand the political scope and autonomy of his role – the case of Palestine – they hurl the adjective ‘political’ as an accusation against him. In regard to Palestine, Lie supposedly overstepped the boundaries of what was appropriate for the UN secretary-general by acting on a personal political bias. This chapter will argue, to the contrary, that although Lie may have supported the Zionist cause, there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate the corollary position that such support constituted the key driver of his actions.