Comparative Political Economy does not only study country variation and macroeconomic policy issues on the demand side, but also institutional differences between countries on the supply side. The predominant approach here is called ‘Comparative Capitalisms’ (Clift, 2014; Menz, 2017; Nölke, 2019b). It analyses the differences between the economic institutions of countries at the company level. The focus is on country-specific comparative advantages for companies with regard to certain products and services that go along with these institutions. Among the most important company-level institutions are: the system of corporate governance (that is, who owns and directs a company); the financial sector (as the source for funding); industrial relations (that is, the relations with workers); and training systems, innovation and competition policy.

As we shall see, the coronavirus crisis has substantial implications with regard to each of these institutions. In order to stabilize companies during the crisis, many states have taken on a more prominent role within corporate governance; for example, via (partial) state ownership (Chapter 12). In contrast to the GFC in 2008/09, this crisis did not emerge in the financial sector. Still, the financial sector has contributed to deepening the crisis, particularly via private equity investments in the health sector (Chapter 13). While the crisis led to a short spring of ‘covid corporatism’ – that is, a close collaboration between companies, unions and the state – labour unions did not play a crucial role in economic reconstructions and may also be sidelined in their role within vocational training systems (Chapter 14). In terms of innovation, the pandemic stimulated two systems in particular: on the one side, it demonstrated the important role of state support for innovation (for example, with regard to vaccine development); on the other, it highlighted the useful role of frugal innovation (Chapter 15). Finally, the pandemic raises severe issues for competition policy, both with regard to the massive utilization of state aid and to the market power of US digital behemoths (Chapter 16).