The case of Brazil is analysed in this chapter as a case of non-reluctance in regional crisis management. The analysis will focus on Brazil's approach to the two most severe crises in the country's extended regional neighbourhood: on Brazil's leadership of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and on Brazil's approach to the Colombian civil war between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army) and the Colombian government. As for the other cases analysed in this book, I will address crisis management in a period of political stability. In the case of Brazil, the years of the first presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (often just called ‘Lula’) were indeed a period of stability, and one in which Brazil clearly wanted to become engaged in international affairs. President Lula of the leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party), a former labour leader who had already run for the presidency of Brazil three times without success, was elected president in the general election of 2002 defeating his rival of the centre-right Brazilian Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB, Social Democracy Party) in a landslide in the second round. In the 2006 general election, Lula was re-elected, again after failing to prevail in the first round, but winning a landslide in the second round.

The eight years of Lula's first presidency (2003–10) were a period of great stability for Brazil for several reasons. Lula's leftist government promoted a series of social schemes such as the famous Bolsa Família (Family Allowance) and the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) programme, which contributed to a remarkable drop in poverty levels in the country. Economic growth rose steadily in the early 2000s, reaching 7.5 per cent in 2010 (Kaufman and García-Escribano, 2013). Correspondingly, and most importantly, Lula's government was extremely popular, with approval ratings of 80 per cent of respondents in December 2010, and a remarkable personal approval rate of 87 per cent for the president (Reuters, 2010).

In parallel to social and economic development, the years 2003–10 were also characterized by an entirely new intensity in Brazil's engagement in world politics.