Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem
- 2 Weak Interactions: Asymmetry of Time or Asymmetry in Time?
- 3 Presentism and the Flow of Time
- 4 Presentism and the Notion of Existence
- 5 Meyer’s Struggle with Presentism or How We Can Understand the Debate between Presentism and Eternalism
- 6 Dynamic Presentism and the Grounding Objection
- 7 Brute Past Presentism, Dynamic Presentism, and the Objection from Being-Supervenience
- 8 Entropy and the Direction of Time
- Bibliography
- Index of Subjects
- Index of Names
Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem
- 2 Weak Interactions: Asymmetry of Time or Asymmetry in Time?
- 3 Presentism and the Flow of Time
- 4 Presentism and the Notion of Existence
- 5 Meyer’s Struggle with Presentism or How We Can Understand the Debate between Presentism and Eternalism
- 6 Dynamic Presentism and the Grounding Objection
- 7 Brute Past Presentism, Dynamic Presentism, and the Objection from Being-Supervenience
- 8 Entropy and the Direction of Time
- Bibliography
- Index of Subjects
- Index of Names
Summary
This collection of my papers consists of mostly previously published articles which develop a scientific research program designed to defend a dynamic view of reality. Although such a view could seem to be obvious taking into account our everyday experience, we have so many conceptual difficulties with explaining the origin and mechanism of these dynamics and especially those stemming from physics that such a vindication is necessary.
At the outset, it would be useful to supply a reminder of why the flow of time is denied by the majority of both physicists and philosophers and why they stubbornly try to see reality as a four-dimensional static block universe. Well, these reasons are well-known:
1) There are conceptual problem with explaining what the flow of time consists in;
2) Physics, which is supposed to describe all fundamental phenomena in the world, does not provide us with a theory of the flow of time;
3) Even worse, if we assume that the flow of time consists in this that an infinity of global layers of Now come into existence successively, then it turns out that—according to the theory of relativity—there is no distinguished hypersurface of simultaneity and there are models of general theory of relativity (GTR) in which there are no such global hypersurfaces at all.
In this book, I briefly analyze different aspects of the problem of the flow of time and attempt to show—following Henri Bergson (although I should emphasize that I do not agree with the entirety of his view)—that the reasons for the difficulty with the acceptance of its reality may lie in inadequate metaphysics and a confidence in physics which goes too far. The papers are intended to answer such fundamental questions as: What is the origin of dynamics of the world?; What is the origin and nature of time?; Does the flow of time really exist and what it consists in?; Is physics consistent with existence of the flow of time?; Why don’t we have a physical theory of the flow of time?
There are two similar yet subtly different approaches to the problem of the dynamics of the world which are analyzed in this book: the first is based on the well-known notion of becoming, while the second is based on the notion of dynamic existence proposed by the author, a generalization of the notion of becoming.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- In Defence of a Dynamic View of Reality , pp. 9 - 20Publisher: Jagiellonian University PressPrint publication year: 2022