Not being able to read the handwriting on the wall – the year 1948 marked the beginning of the end as far as the Truman Administration's support for its faithful Dutch ally was concerned – authorities in The Hague and Batavia interpreted the Renville Agreement, concluded in mid-January 1948, as a tangible pro- Dutch breakthrough. An important factor in convincing Dutch politicians in both the Netherlands and the Indonesian archipelago that an auspicious shift in US foreign policy had taken place in their favor was a leak that occurred on January 5,1948.E.F.Drumwright, a Far Eastern Affairs specialist in the US Embassy in London, provided a Dutch diplomat with a detailed description of the telegram that the US Under Secretary of State,Robert Lovett, had sent on New Year's Eve to America's GOC representative, Frank Porter Graham, in Batavia. Lovett's cable, according to Drumright, made it abundantly clear that the Netherlands, because of its economic and political centrality in US plans for Europe's economic recovery,should maintain control of the Indonesian archipelago for the foreseeable future.

Lovett's telegram was composed after a tentative but critical discussion had occurred among the different regional divisions within the State Department.The cable repudiated the pro-Republican course of action Graham had sketched out in his so-called “Christmas Message,” which had horrified Dutch authorities in The Hague as well as negotiators participating in the GOC meetings on board the USS Renville. Graham had drafted his Christmas proposal to advocate a Dutch-Indonesian settlement that in essence called for a return to the status quo ante bellum. Drumwright's timely disclosure, therefore, effectively alleviated Dutch uncertainties about Washington's appraisals of the legitimacy of their cause. As a result, the Dutch GOC delegation on the USS Renville suddenly mustered and projected a new self-assurance, because their secret knowledge of Lovett and Marshall's analysis of the Indonesian Question seemed to tip the delicate balance of the negotiations in the Netherlands’ favor. Understandably, the message contained in Lovett's telegram put the Dutch Ambassador in Washington, Eelco van Kleffens,in an exhilarated mood.“I believe I am correct,”he wrote to the Dutch Foreign Minister upon receiving the news,“when I register my belief that American policy has undergone an alteration in our direction.”