The Heisei period was one-third shorter than the formative Meiji period, and only half the length of the immediately preceding Showa period. Covering three decades without Japanese involvement in international armed conflict, and in political and economic terms witnessing few major internal upheavals, it may be seen as an easier period to categorize. Natural disasters may be what characterize Japan in the early 21st century: volcanic eruptions, floods and landslides recurred, while in particular the earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 (Heisei 23) led to the loss of around 20,000 lives and one nuclear power plant undergoing a meltdown whose after-effects will remain for decades to come. At the time of writing, virtually all university students were born in the Heisei period—indeed in the early years of the 21st century. Thus, this chapter describes what is current experience for the current population of Japan.

Dramatic demographic changes

A comparison of some of the vital statistics of Japanese HE in the first year and last full year of Heisei gives a sense of the dramatic demographic changes which color this period. In 1989 the population of 18-year-olds (the standard age of entrance to HE in Japan) was around 2 million; in 2018 it was less than 1.2 million. In 1989 fewer than 50% of secondary school graduates went on to HE; in 2018 more than 80% did. In 1989 there were 500 universities and 590 junior colleges in Japan; in 2018 these figures had risen and fallen respectively to 780 and 330. One does not need to look far beyond these statistics to identify a number of major structural reforms which were also implemented during Heisei, such as the incorporation of national and municipal HE institutions, the creation of new categories such as professional graduate schools and corporate universities, and the establishment of a mandatory third-party evaluation regime. These changes provide the entry point for this chapter’s analysis of HE in the Heisei period. Ultimately, the chapter advances the idea of Heisei as a period of frustrated reform, in which the changes that did eventuate fell far short of, or deviated considerably from, the kinds of fundamental transformations anticipated in late Showa.