Bibliography

Mark Rowlands

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511487538.012

Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009

Mark Rowlands

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Mark Rowlands: Affiliation:
University College Cork

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Type: Chapter
Information: The Nature of Consciousness , pp. 236 - 241

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487538.012 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2001

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