Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Innovation and industry evolution
- Part II Firm growth and market structure
- Part III Policy implications
- 10 The effects of research tool patents and licensing on biomedical innovation
- 11 Upstream patents and public health: the case of genetic testing for breast cancer
- 12 Competition, regulation, and intellectual property management in genetically modified foods: evidence from survey data
- 13 Governance, policy, and industry strategies: pharmaceuticals and agro-biotechnology
- 14 The dynamics of knowledge accumulation, regulation, and appropriability in the pharma-biotech sector: policy issues
- Index
- References
11 - Upstream patents and public health: the case of genetic testing for breast cancer
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Innovation and industry evolution
- Part II Firm growth and market structure
- Part III Policy implications
- 10 The effects of research tool patents and licensing on biomedical innovation
- 11 Upstream patents and public health: the case of genetic testing for breast cancer
- 12 Competition, regulation, and intellectual property management in genetically modified foods: evidence from survey data
- 13 Governance, policy, and industry strategies: pharmaceuticals and agro-biotechnology
- 14 The dynamics of knowledge accumulation, regulation, and appropriability in the pharma-biotech sector: policy issues
- Index
- References
Summary
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to explore the medical and health care implications of the growing tendency to grant patents on human genes. Taking the genetic testing of breast cancer as an example, we show how the granting of these large-scope patents, covering upstream scientific information, is likely to have very damaging consequences as far downstream as the health care system itself.
In the second section we explain why the granting of this new type of “upstream” patent, exemplified by patents on genes, is so significant. We show that the major problem posed by these patents, which benefit from an extremely large scope, including “future” and “potential” applications, is that they are likely to give rise to widespread monopolies. This will impede the design and marketing of products developed using the same genetic information, with serious consequences not only for the future of research but also for the whole chain of medical practice.
In the third section we use the case of genetic testing for breast cancer, linked to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, to illustrate the issues raised by these new patents. In the case of BRCA1 and BRCA2, the private American firm Myriad Genetics has been granted several patents, providing it with a monopoly over the diagnostic and therapeutic activities based on these genes. We begin by describing how the granting of these patents enabled the firm to build a monopoly over every aspect of diagnostic activity in the United States.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Knowledge Accumulation and Industry EvolutionThe Case of Pharma-Biotech, pp. 327 - 345Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
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