Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wzw2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-12T23:44:52.709Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

Shane Greenstein
Affiliation:
Elinor and Wendell Hobbs Professor in the Management and Strategy Department Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University
Victor Stango
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Business Administration Tuck School of Business Dartmouth
Shane Greenstein
Affiliation:
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
Victor Stango
Affiliation:
Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College
Get access

Summary

Technological standards are a cornerstone of the modern information economy. These standards affect firm strategy, market performance and, by extension, economic growth. While there is general agreement that swift movement to superior technological standards is a worthwhile goal, there is much less agreement on how an economy can attain those goals in specific instances. Sometimes there are even debates about whether appropriate standards arose in past episodes – for example, academics still dispute whether Betamax was a technically superior video cassette recorder (VCR) to VHS. Answers are not transparent because a variety of market and nonmarket processes determines the evolution of standards. By default, decentralized market mechanisms, private firms, and standards development organizations shape the development and diffusion of standards.

In addition, when government actors step in to sponsor a new standard or move the market between standards, as they occasionally do, debates about the interaction of competing market and technical factors are not merely academic, nor are the answers transparent. Government actors can make choices about competing specifications for a standard and often have the power to mandate compliance with the standard. Moreover, rarely are these decisions reversed, and when they are, the events are noted for their rarity. For example, the Federal Communication Commission's decision to alter its prior choice over the color television standard a few years later prevented the country from employing technology that all experts regarded as obsolete.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Becker, G. S. 1983. “A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besen, S., and Farrell, J. 1994. “Choosing how to compete: Strategies and tactics in standardization,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8: 117–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besen, S., and Johnson, L. L. 1986. “Compatibility standards, competition, and innovation in the broadcasting industry,” Rand Report: R-3453-NSF, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, November.Google Scholar
David, P. A., and Greenstein, S. 1990. “The economics of compatibility standards: An introduction to recent research,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 1: 3–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dranove, D., and Gandal, N. 2003. “The DVD vs. DIVX standard war: Empirical evidence of preannouncement effects,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 12: 363–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, D. 2003. “The antitrust economics of multi-sided platform markets,” Yale Journal on Regulation 20: 325–81.Google Scholar
Farrell, J. 1989. “Standardization and intellectual property,” Jurimetrics Journal 30: 35–50.Google Scholar
Farrell, J. 1995. “Arguments for weaker intellectual property protection in network industries,” StandardView 3: 46–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, J.1996. “Choosing the rules for formal standardization,” mimeo, University of California, Berkeley.
Farrell, J., and P. Klemperer, in press. “Coordination and lock-in: Competition with switching costs and network effects,” in Handbook of industrial organization, Vol. III, Armstrong, Mark and Porter, Robert (eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Farrell, J., and Saloner, G. 1985. “Standardization, compatibility and innovation,” RAND Journal of Economics 16: 70–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farrell, J., and Shapiro, C. 1992. “Standard setting in high-definition television,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1992: 1–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gabel, H. L. 1987. Product standardization and competitive strategy: Advanced series in management, Vol. XI. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Gabel, H. L. 1991. Competitive strategies for product standards. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Gandal, N. 2002. “Compatibility, standardization and network effects: Some policy implications,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18: 80–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gandal, N., Greenstein, S., and Salant, D. 1999. “Adoptions and orphans in the early microcomputer market,” Journal of Industrial Economics 47: 87–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grindley, P. 1995. Standards strategy and policy. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katz, M. L., and Shapiro, C. 1994. “Systems competition and network effects,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8: 93–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knittel, Christopher, and Victor Stango 2004. “Incompatibility, product attributes and consumer welfare: Evidence from ATMs,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #10962, Cambridge, MA.
Nair, H., P. Chintagunta, and J. Dube 2003. “Empirical analysis of indirect network effects in the market for personal digital assistants,” mimeo, University of Chicago.
Neuman, Russell W., McKnight, Lee W., and Soloman, Richard Jay 1999. The Gordian Knot: Gridlock on the information highway. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Ohashi, H. 2003. “The role of network effects in the US VCR market, 1978–86,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 12: 447–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peltzman, S. 1976. “Toward a more general theory of regulation,” Journal of Law & Economics, 19: 211–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rohlfs, Jeffrey 2001. Bandwagon effects in high technology industries. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Rysman, M. 2003. “Competition between networks: A study of the market for Yellow Pages,” Review of Economic Studies 71: 483–512.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schmidt, S. K. and Werle, R. 1998. Coordinating technology: Studies in international standardization of telecommunications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Stango, Victor 2004. “The economics of standards wars,” Review of Network Economics 3: 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stigler, G. 1971. “The theory of economic regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: 3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiss, M. B. H. 1993. “The standards development process: A view from political theory,” Standard View 1: 35–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Introduction
    • By Shane Greenstein, Elinor and Wendell Hobbs Professor in the Management and Strategy Department Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University, Victor Stango, Associate Professor of Business Administration Tuck School of Business Dartmouth
  • Edited by Shane Greenstein, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Victor Stango, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College
  • Book: Standards and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493249.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Introduction
    • By Shane Greenstein, Elinor and Wendell Hobbs Professor in the Management and Strategy Department Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University, Victor Stango, Associate Professor of Business Administration Tuck School of Business Dartmouth
  • Edited by Shane Greenstein, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Victor Stango, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College
  • Book: Standards and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493249.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
    • By Shane Greenstein, Elinor and Wendell Hobbs Professor in the Management and Strategy Department Kellogg School of Management Northwestern University, Victor Stango, Associate Professor of Business Administration Tuck School of Business Dartmouth
  • Edited by Shane Greenstein, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Victor Stango, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College
  • Book: Standards and Public Policy
  • Online publication: 22 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493249.001
Available formats
×