In §113 of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel introduces the concept of “action”: He specifies action as “The expression of the will as subjective or moral” (R §113). He continues, “Only with the expression of the moral will do we come to action” (ibid. – Hegel's emphases). The first statement declares each expression of the subjective moral will to be an action; the statement provides a sufficient condition for an event's being an action. The second statement claims that only the expression of the subjective moral will is action. There is no action that is not the expression of the subjective or moral will. This second statement thus names a necessary condition for an event's being an action. It is clear from these two statements, taken together, that Hegel claims “expression of the moral or subjective will” to be the necessary and sufficient condition for an event belonging to the determination “action.”

Hegel justifies this introduction of the concept of “action” by claiming that the action contains

This justification, which I will interpret in the course of this book, refers back to the conceptual development of the subjective will that Hegel “expounded” in §§104–112.