Throughout history, practical judgment has been addressed by a broad spectrum of philosophers and theorists. But it holds particular significance for thinkers who do not avail themselves of what might be called hard foundations for their ontologies, epistemologies, or ethics. In this respect, practical judgment has been of interest to Aristotelians more than Platonists, to Humeans more than Kantians, to hermeneuticists more than analytical philosophers, and to pragmatists and post-modernists more than (neo)structuralists and strict behavioralists. Of course, Plato, Kant, and many modernist thinkers have made important contributions to our understanding of practical judgment. Still, those who temper the pursuit of essences with the narrative investigation of experience generally find practical judgment of utmost significance. So much depends upon good judgment, anti-essentialists agree, because so little is available to greater certainty. Judgment is a crucial faculty as a result of the multiple (cognitive) paradoxes and (normative) dilemmas that infuse contemporary life, notwithstanding the impact of scientific methodologies, metaphysical principles, or religious doctrine.

To valorize judgment is not to condone relativism. Quite the contrary. To the extent that relativism connotes an “anything goes” attitude, it wholly negates the importance of judgment. Good judgment is what is most needed in a world burdened by claims that subjective preferences are the final word.