At the beginning of the Introduction to this book, I quoted philosopher John Searle's recent observation that “we [do not] have a clear theory of human rights. On the contrary, … the necessary work is just beginning.” My aim in this book, as the book's title indicates, has been to contribute to “the necessary work [that] is just beginning.”

There are (at least) three major issues with which a theory of human rights must deal – and with which I have dealt in this book. The first and most fundamental of the three issues is whether there is a non-religious (secular) ground for the morality of human rights – for the claim that each and every (born) human being has inherent dignity and is inviolable. (That there is a religious ground – indeed, more than one religious ground – is undeniable.) As I noted in the Introduction, the claim that every human being has inherent dignity and is inviolable is deeply problematic for many secular thinkers, because the claim is difficult – perhaps to the point of being impossible – to align with one of their reigning intellectual convictions, what Bernard Williams called “Nietzsche's thought”: “[T]here is, not only no God, but no metaphysical order of any kind …”

The second major issue concerns the relationship between the morality of human rights and the law of human rights: What laws should we who affirm that every human being has inherent dignity and is inviolable, because we affirm it, press our government – our elected representatives – to enact?