The best-known version of liberalism today – indeed, the version that is often equated with liberalism simply – is John Rawls's antiperfectionist liberalism, developed in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1992). Rawls's theory of “justice as fairness” was a response to the perceived inadequacies of the previously dominant utilitarian theory, especially the insecurity of rights and instability of politics in a utilitarian system. In its final form, Rawls's philosophy claimed to be, not a neo-Kantian comprehensive liberalism – a specific “comprehensive” theological/philosophical position – but rather a “political liberalism” that was “neutral” with respect to fundamental comprehensive views. In the final analysis, however, it appears that Rawls was unable to vindicate this claim. Political liberalism is a form of comprehensive liberalism in the name of which a significant range of comprehensive views – especially traditional religious and moral views – are excluded from political life.

In this chapter, I begin with a summary of Rawls's political liberalism, which tries to identify what it seeks to achieve, and then explain why I think it is unsuccessful.

Rawls's Political Liberalism

Rawls begins with conceptions he considers implicit in our political culture. The first is that of citizens as free and equal persons, who have a capacity to understand and act on principles regulating a scheme of social cooperation and a capacity to develop, revise, and pursue rationally a conception of the good.