In historical scholarship and American collective memory alike, the Thirteenth Amendment is celebrated as the constitutional death notice of Southern chattel slavery. Ratified in 1865, as the Confederacy crumbled and four million slaves walked off the plantations, the Amendment recognized in law the practical destruction of slavery. That the Amendment proscribed chattel slavery of the sort that had flourished in the South for almost two centuries is incontrovertible; but that it was “an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States,” in Justice Joseph P. Bradley's oft-quoted phrase, is much less certain, for as well as pronouncing dead one kind of involuntary bondage, the Amendment breathed symbolic life into another. Slavery and involuntary servitude were prohibited, “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” On its face, the Amendment declared penal varieties of slavery and involuntary servitude permissible; it made conviction for crime the sole grounds for the imposition of involuntary servitude on American soil, and exempted those “duly convicted” of crime from the otherwise universal prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude.